




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


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U.S.-USSR Mutual Interests Examined

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[Article by Sergey Mikhaylovich Rogov, doctor of historical sciences and chief research associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "The Interaction of USSR and U.S. Interests"; words in italics or boldface as published]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev's four meetings with R. Reagan in the last 3 years have shown that Soviet-American relations cannot be viewed only from the standpoint of rivalry between socialism and capitalism. The dialectical nature of these relations presupposes coinciding and conflicting interests and confrontation and interaction. At the meeting in Moscow on 31 May 1988, M.S. Gorbachev said: "The truth is that while the Soviet Union and the United States are building their relationship, they can only realize their own interests effectively if they assess the partner's interests and intentions realistically and take them into account."

All countries and all groups of states have their own interests. Furthermore, it is not only the content of these interests that plays an important role, but also the specific ways in which they coincide and interact. They can strengthen each other by providing strong impetus for certain international developments, but they can also work in dissimilar or even opposite ways.

We know that F. Engels said that "the economic relations of each specific society are primarily reflected as *interests*."¹ Consequently, interests can be regarded as the connecting link between the objective laws of social development and the conscious actions of people. The term "interest" is related to the term "need," but they are not identical because the former reflects the selective attitude of the social subject (a class or a nation) to the objective trends of social development. Interests are supposed to satisfy certain physical and spiritual needs. The realization of interests represents, on the one hand, the survival (or self-reproduction) of the subjects and, on the other, the creative process or subjective actions of people. This is why interests are a major source of social progress, although the subject's interpretation of them might impede long-overdue social changes.

The relationship between class and general human interests is variable and depends on the objective content of the historical process under specific conditions and at a specific time. V.I. Lenin wrote that, "from the standpoint of basic Marxist ideas, the interests of social development supersede the interests of the proletariat."² In our day, Lenin's idea about the priority of the interests of social development has acquired new meaning

and significance. This is the first time survival has been such a crucial matter for all countries, all social groups, and mankind as a biological species. This is why there is an objective need for the new political thinking, with the recognition of the absolute priority of general human values as the nucleus of this thinking. This does not mean the "abolition" of class interests. As long as classes exist, their domestic and foreign policy interests will also exist. Their sphere of influence is limited, however, under present conditions. The nuclear stalemate has made it impossible to settle the question of "who will do what to whom" with force. The rivalry between socialism and capitalism cannot be resolved with weapons. It is becoming obvious that war has ceased to be a political instrument, and this applies to so-called conventional warfare as well as to nuclear war. For the first time in the history of the class struggle, armed conflict and violence have ceased to be the winning cards as far as progress is concerned.

Therefore, the competition between socialism and capitalism, stemming from class interests, must be carried out only by peaceful means. As the CPSU Program says, "the historical dispute between the two opposing systems into which today's world is divided can and must be settled peacefully.... The interests of all people demand that intergovernmental relations be directed into the channel of peaceful competition and equitable cooperation."³ The global nature of world economic ties and the related interdependence of the two systems should serve as the objective basis for this.

The evolution of interests is also changing the balance of interests. A realistic foreign policy is now distinguished by two features: consideration for national interests and respect for the interests of other states. The efforts to balance them entail mutually beneficial agreements and mutual compromises based on common, coinciding interests. This kind of balance in Soviet-American relations requires not only scrupulous concern for the partner's military-strategic security but also the renunciation of all attempts to impose foreign policy objectives on other countries and the inclination to view other countries and whole regions of the world as spheres of one's own "vital interests."

The Paradox of Security Interests

The interests of any state depend on a group of diverse factors. We will take a look at the exact ways in which these interests are reflected in Soviet-American relations. The most striking feature is that the USSR and the United States lack many of the "classic" forms of conflicting interests recorded in history. For example, and this is quite significant, the two countries do not have any claims on one another's territory.

The security interests of states have traditionally served as a source of conflict in their relations. One state's desire for absolute security signifies the absolute insecurity or even the extinction of the other. History is full of

examples of predatory and aggressive wars fought on the pretext of "guaranteeing the security" of states. The "national security" doctrine Washington adopted after World War II, which extended the "zone of U.S. security interests" to almost the entire world, was also of an expansionist nature. This was a false approach to these matters because it was based on the fictitious "Soviet threat" and demanded the escalation of the arms race for the purpose of establishing a "position of strength." This kind of military policy does not seem to serve the real security interests of the United States; it only serves the selfish needs of the military-industrial complex. Of course, the United States, just as any other country, has real, and not mythical, security interests, even though history and geography have put this country in a privileged position. American territory was never threatened seriously until after the appearance of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the nuclear arms race Washington started has jeopardized not only the security but also the continued existence of the American nation.

There is a similar threat to the survival of the USSR, although the military threat to us is not limited to nuclear weapons. Even in the 20th century the territory and the very existence of our state (in contrast to the United States) have been in danger more than once as a result of a conventional armed conflict, and although this threat is not as strong today, it still has not disappeared completely. Our country's security interests are of a defensive nature and are aimed at preventing nuclear disaster and eliminating the threat of war.

In the nuclear age security cannot be guaranteed by the unilateral use of military equipment. This problem calls for political solutions. There are no class or state interests that can be defended with a nuclear war. Any attempt to safeguard security interests at the expense of the other side's security is counterproductive because it destabilizes the situation and could make it uncontrollable.

Under these conditions the 27th CPSU Congress set forth an innovative theory regarding the balance of security interests: "Security, in the case of relations between the USSR and the United States, can only be mutual, and in the case of international relations as a whole it can only be universal."⁴ A state's concern for its own national security now demands consideration for the security interests of the other side. Adversaries have to become partners and seek the road to common security together.

Therefore, the interaction of the security interests of the Soviet Union and the United States is undergoing a qualitative evolution. Whereas these interests were almost exclusively confrontational in the first postwar decades, the interest in averting nuclear war later forced the two sides to take parallel actions in the interest of maintaining strategic parity or, in the terminology of American scientists and politicians, "mutual intimidation." The common interests of the USSR and the

United States are now objectively aimed at a radical lowering of the strategic balance to the lowest possible level. This is the dialectic of the nuclear space age. It is indicative that after the two countries created the colossal destructive potential to destroy one another several times over, they had to begin negotiations and discuss the quantitative and qualitative features of the most modern weapons with the aim of their reduction and elimination; they are establishing unprecedented standards for the mutual verification and control of assumed commitments, allowing the "adversary" access to the top-secret military installations that are still inaccessible to most of their own citizens. This cooperation reflects a conscious choice by the USSR and the United States in favor of restraint and self-control in the most sensitive sphere of the two countries' interrelations.

Of course, the security interests of the USSR and the United States are still far from harmonious. Only the first steps have been taken to create the mechanism for their coordination. As M.S. Gorbachev said, "we must move toward the mutual realization of the particular level of arms on each side that can be called relatively sufficient from the standpoint of reliable defense."⁵ It will take a long and complicated process of arms reduction before the military confrontation between the USSR and the United States can cease completely. It is precisely in this sphere that we find the key link of qualitative changes in the nature of Soviet-American relations.

The Role of Economic Interests

The almost total absence of directly conflicting economic interests is probably also of positive significance in Soviet-U.S. relations. Throughout the history of international relations it has been economic conflicts that have usually given rise to political and military conflicts. As we know, economic interests are fundamental in the foreign policy process. The absence of economic competition is a unique and unprecedented feature of Soviet-American relations, distinguishing them from earlier forms of intergovernmental confrontation. The development of trade and economic relations between the two countries can be mutually beneficial and, in my opinion, cannot give rise to any conflicts within the foreseeable future.

It is also significant that Soviet-American economic contacts have become a function of ideological and political relations in recent decades. The reason for this anomaly is that the main question in USSR-U.S. relations is the question of war and peace. All other aspects of our relations, including trade and economic ties, are subordinate to this main aspect.

Unfortunately, the political factor is having a negative effect on trade and economic relations between the USSR and the United States. The continuation of the economic warfare Washington has been waging against our country for many years is an anachronism. After all, in an interdependent world the deliberate undermining

of the economies of others impedes the growth of the modern world market and thereby compounds the state's own problems. The perestroika in the USSR and the accelerated development of our economy are no threat to anyone. On the contrary, the more successful we are in realizing the potential of the socialist economy, the more our country can contribute to the stability of the world economy.

Parallel Soviet and U.S. interests can now be seen in the economic sphere. On the one hand, the radical perestroika of our economy and the USSR's enhanced competitive potential in the world marketplace are establishing the preconditions for this. This is sure to promote not only the considerable expansion of Soviet-American trade but also the establishment of mixed enterprises, and this will transfer the interaction of economic interests into a qualitatively different sphere. On the one hand, there will be a greater need for USSR-U.S. cooperation in the resolution of global problems, including the ecological crisis and the exploration of the world ocean and outer space. The two states could also play a key role in surmounting hunger and disease in the "Third World." Of course, this kind of mutually beneficial cooperation and collaboration will transcend the bounds of purely economic interests. The development of economic interdependence will play a politically stabilizing role.

This will require fundamental changes in the U.S. approach. Can we expect American capitalism to accept the need for nuclear disarmament, a just economic order, and the priority of general human values? This will mean the loss of highly profitable business by influential groups, but the vital interests of the USSR and the United States demand the elimination of the burdensome arms race. The interests of the military-industrial complex, as "low-priority interests," will conflict with the higher interests of the survival of the United States and the entire world.

Political Interests

In this case political interests signify the desire of a state to expand and strengthen its position and influence in the international arena. Because of the rivalry between the two systems in today's interdependent world, the USSR and the United States are entering into the most diverse geostrategic relationships. At the press conference in Geneva in 1985, M.S. Gorbachev said: "Of course, the Soviet Union and the United States are two strong powers with global interests and with their own allies and friends. They have their own foreign policy priorities, but the Soviet leadership sees this not as a source of confrontation but, rather, as a source of special and heightened responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States, on the part of their leaders, for the future of the world."⁶

The two powers' closest ties are with their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies. These historically engendered alliances will retain their significance for U.S. and USSR

interests for a long time even if their military organizations should be dissolved. Any attempts to undermine them would be senseless and futile. The fact that both the USSR and the United States have global interests should not be regarded as a threat, but as a potential source of stability in the world arena, as a factor promoting the two greatest powers' performance of their role as initiators of the process of creating a system of international security—a role assigned to them by history.

This responsibility is also connected with the role of the USSR and the United States in regional crises. Unfortunately, almost all major regional conflicts in the postwar period, with the possible exception of the Iran-Iraq war and the Falkland crisis, have turned into Soviet-American confrontations. The involvement of the great powers has frequently led to direct military intervention, and the most outrageous example of this was the U.S. intervention in Indochina.

The idea that the outcome of East-West confrontation would supposedly be decided in the "Third World," an idea which came into being two or three decades ago, played a negative role. The American side was inclined to see the "hand of Moscow" in any national liberation movement. We were also frequently inclined to interpret any resistance of progressive changes by reactionary feudal and bourgeois forces as the "intrigues of U.S. imperialist circles." In general, the era of national liberation wars gave the interaction of American and Soviet interests in developing countries the nature of incessant rivalry, and this created the danger of direct confrontations between the United States and the USSR several times.

Today the development of the "Third World" has entered a new phase. It would be wrong and extremely dangerous to see the kaleidoscope of regional conflicts only as a continuation of East-West rivalry. Conflicting interests in this part of the world serve as an inner source of acute regional conflicts.

In the 1970's and 1980's many "low-intensity" conflicts in various parts of the world tended to go on for a long time and become increasingly devastating. In several cases neither of the opposing sides was capable of winning the conflict. Under these conditions, the projection of Soviet-American conflicts onto the regional conflicts became extremely dangerous. These regional conflicts must not become a battleground between the two systems or a sphere of confrontation between the USSR and the United States. Now people everywhere realize that the threat of a nuclear war capable of destroying the entire world is posed less by a "central conflict" or by bilateral Soviet-American contradictions than by (if we exclude the danger of the accidental start of war) the possible escalation of a regional conflict. This situation is dangerous in itself, but it is also having a negative effect on the entire range of Soviet-American relations, including the priority sphere of disarmament. We should recall that this served as the pretext for the delays in the SALT-I talks and the failure to ratify the SALT-II treaty.

For this reason, it is difficult to anticipate any lasting stabilization of USSR-U.S. relations as long as their political interests come into confrontation in regional conflicts. Therefore, the restructuring of these relations cannot be confined to the sphere of disarmament but must also extend to the very approach to crisis situations. The new political thinking with its general human values must be employed in Soviet-American relations in the "Third World" so that they will promote, and not prevent, the consistent process of disarmament. A new tendency which recently became apparent in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Central America—a tendency toward national conciliation and a search for political compromises, regardless of pronounced differences of opinion between opponents—is an important prerequisite for the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts with a view to the interests of all opposing sides. The policy of national conciliation reflects the application of the new political thinking to "low-intensity" conflicts in various parts of the world.

Regional problems now occupy a prominent place in Soviet-American dialogue. The Soviet Union recognizes the great importance of the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, southern Africa, and other "Third World" regions to the United States from the standpoint of historically engendered economic ties and has no intention of violating these legitimate interests. The USSR has asked the American leadership to work with it in finding solutions to problems in the "Third World." The increasing significance of the settlement of crises in various parts of the world for the reduction of international tension and the improvement of East-West relations was acknowledged during Soviet-American talks. The purpose of the USSR-U.S. dialogue on these issues is the assistance of the sides involved in regional conflicts, a search for peaceful solutions, and the promotion of their independence, freedom, and security. In the presence of political will, "low-intensity" conflicts can be settled with a view to the interests of all sides. The political interaction of the USSR and the United States has produced tangible results—the signing of the agreement on Afghanistan on 14 April this year in Geneva, with Moscow and Washington as its guarantors. The completion of the political settlement in Afghanistan could serve as the precedent for constructive cooperation in the resolution of other regional conflicts.

The Role of Ideological Factors

The security, economic, and political interests of the USSR and the United States are indissolubly connected with ideological factors. Soviet-American rivalry is primarily a result of conflicts between the bourgeois and socialist views of the world. As we know, various ideologies compete with one another within countries and on the global level. Does this mean that the ideological struggle in the world arena is the same as the conflict between the ideologies of opposing classes in a single socioeconomic structure? Is ideological struggle compatible with peaceful coexistence, or does it tend to "ideologize" international relations?

If the ideological struggle signifies a demand that the other side give up its philosophical values as "payment" for peaceful coexistence and if the "black-and-white" view of the world serves as the pretext for another "crusade" against the other side, the answer to these questions must be negative. The restructuring of international relations is intended to establish the kind of world order in which each society would develop in line with its own philosophical, ideological, political, and religious or atheistic views and the corresponding socioeconomic structures.

The ideologized approach to foreign policy issues, as we can see from, for example, the American project "Democracy," is just another variety of narrow class egocentrism and an attempt to impose alien values on others. "It is impossible to move toward more harmonious relations between the USSR and the United States as long as ideological myths retain their power," M.S. Gorbachev said, drawing the following fundamentally important conclusion: "This means that political positions must be free of ideological intolerance. Ideological disagreements must not be carried over to the sphere of intergovernmental relations or influence foreign policy, because ideologies can be polar opposites while the interest of survival and the interest of preventing war are universal and supreme."⁷

There must be the realization, first of all, that the conflict of ideas cannot be settled by force at any time, and especially in the nuclear space age. As long as different socioeconomic systems exist, ideological pluralism in the world arena will be unavoidable.

In the second place, the preservation of any philosophical system is not only a matter of class considerations; general human aspects are also invariably present in the hierarchy of ideological values. The ideas of scientific socialism rest on the humanistic spiritual values mankind has achieved throughout history. The Marxist-Leninist ideology did not emerge from a vacuum; it was a generalization and reworking of everything "of value in the development of human thought and culture over more than 2,000 years."⁸

It appears that during the interaction of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies it is not all of the components of the philosophical structures that come into conflict, but just the "upper stories" of the ideological hierarchies, the elements defended by the corresponding class interests in concentrated form. This has generally led to the confrontation of ideological systems in general.

This conclusion seems too limited today, however. On the one hand, we cannot deny that the period of proletarian dictatorship was over long ago in our country. There have been no antagonistic classes in the Soviet Union for many decades. In this sense, we can say that the class ideology in our country has transcended the bounds of narrow class interests and is approaching a general human ideology. On the other hand, there is no

question that the bourgeois ideology is still dominant in the American society. In addition, within the ruling class there are various currents—from rightwing extremist to leftwing liberal—whose political ideologies diverge in many respects. The ideological pluralism in the United States is also reflected in the variability of ideological boundaries and structures, although they are limited in general by the class interests of the American bourgeoisie.

Although differences in general outlook will continue to serve as a source of rivalry between the USSR and the United States, this does not exclude the possibility of finding certain areas of common ground. Of course, this will not be a matter of “ideological convergence,” but of the non-confrontational interaction of the particular elements of the hierarchies of ideological values that meet general human interests. Marx once spoke of the need to “achieve a situation in which the simple laws of morality and justice by which private individuals should be guided in their interrelations also become the highest laws in relations between nations.”⁹ Furthermore, these humanistic imperatives of morality and justice are compatible with ideological aims and with general human spiritual values.

Besides all of this, there is the interaction of ideologies. “When we base our policies on the new thinking, we do not want to remain locked into our customary ideas and our characteristic political language,” M.S. Gorbachev said. “We certainly do not intend to convert everyone to the Marxist faith. The new political thinking can and must be based on the experience of all nations and secure the mutual enrichment and merger of different cultural traditions.”¹⁰ As a result of the reciprocal influence of the two ideologies, new “upper stories” take shape in their hierarchical structure—new philosophical values of a general human nature which do not replace earlier values but do supersede them.

Therefore, the ideological interests of the USSR and the United States are not becoming one-dimensional in today's world, but are growing increasingly complex and multifaceted. The general human priority of survival will necessitate the demilitarization of political thinking rather than the renunciation of class values, will remove the confrontational absolutism from philosophical relations, will create spheres of agreement as well as poles of repulsion, and will destroy the “enemy image.”

We are now witnessing the first signs of the transformation of the ideological competition between the USSR and the United States and its evolution from “psychological warfare” into civilized dialogue. The summit-level talks led to the agreement that ideological “questions—regarding democracy, human rights, and everything related to the humanitarian sphere—must be removed from the realm of political speculation and transferred to the realm of a real investigation of, and familiarization with, the values the American people have developed as a result of free choices and the strides the Soviet people have made since they made their choice in 1917.”¹¹

Correlation of USSR-U.S. Interests

The issue of the interaction of Soviet and American interests is of fundamental importance to an understanding of the content and prospects for the development of relations between these countries and the international situation as a whole with a view to their role in the world arena. If the interests of the two powers are irreconcilable, military conflict is inevitable. If, on the other hand, their differences are not antagonistic—i.e., their interests are not mutually exclusive—their relations can be of a different nature.

The interests of states can change and form different combinations. This gives rise to different patterns of relations between states. The 70-year history of Soviet-American relations seems to have presented four different patterns: military conflict, “cold war,” detente, and politico-military alliance.

The interaction of Soviet and American interests has not been analyzed sufficiently in our scientific literature. The theories of G.A. Trofimenko and I.L. Sheydina are probably of the greatest interest.¹² They could probably be used as the methodological basis for the study of this topic, although they naturally need further interpretation, clarification, and development.

Non-converging interests: The interests of the USSR and the United States cover an extremely broad range and are certainly not confined to Soviet-American relations. Not all of the interests of the two countries are in a state of interaction, and this means that they might not converge at all in some cases. This applies, for example, to some economic interests which are important to the United States but are confined to the framework of the world capitalist market. We do not have a “mirror image” of these interests. The fact that the interests of the two powers are asymmetrical is quite significant because it indicates that the nature of USSR-U.S. relations can never be reduced to a “no-win situation.”

If we take the interaction of interests as the criterion, we can divide these interests into four basic types occupying different points on the scale “ranging from mutual repulsion to mutual attraction.”

Conflicting interests: This is the group of directly opposite, mutually exclusive interests serving as the source of antagonism between states. In the absence of restraining interests, the exacerbation of differences between states will lead to military conflict. Furthermore, history tells us that confrontation can be the result of conflicting interests in the most diverse spheres—from the struggle for markets to religious fanaticism. Confrontation requires the maximum degree of competing interests which cannot be reconciled by non-violent means.

In Soviet-American relations, conflicting interests are found primarily in the ideological sphere. The absolutization of ideological aims can extend the confrontation

to other spheres, including the arms race, regional crises, and economic boycotts.

Diverging interests: In some cases the interests of states contradict one another but display a low degree of competition and do not acquire the nature of direct confrontation. Diverging interests differ from conflicting interests not by the absence of contradictions, but by their lower intensity and severity. Diverging interests can become conflicting interests when the situation is exacerbated. A typical example is the struggle for spheres of influence, for markets, etc.

In the relations between the USSR and the United States, diverging interests are found in the policies of the two states on regional conflicts and third countries. Furthermore, the latter are not simply the objects of these interests and can actively strive to attain their own goals with the partial use of Soviet-American contradictions.

Parallel interests: The interests in this group are distinguished by the absence of antagonism. On the contrary, the sides are pursuing essentially identical or similar goals. Each side, however, strives to realize these interests independently, without coordinating its actions with the other side. There is no conflict whatsoever in this kind of situation, but there is no cooperation either. Parallel interests can evolve either into diverging interests or into cooperation.

Today the parallel interests of the USSR and the United States are most clearly apparent in the approach to global problems, especially the ecological crisis. The heightened interest of the two powers in preventing the escalation of regional crises into direct Soviet-American confrontation also belongs to this category.

Common interests: These are distinguished by the almost identical views of the two states on political objectives and the methods of their attainment. In this case the interests are mutually attractive and become general interests. Common interests presuppose maximum cooperation by the sides.

Today the main common or general interest of the Soviet Union and the United States is the interest in preventing thermonuclear war. The security interests of the two powers are moving into this sphere. Besides this, there are also common interests in the development of bilateral relations.

All of these different types of interests are probably present at any time, but the priority assigned to each differs in different patterns of relations. If conflicting interests are the highest priority and common interests play a minimal role, relations will follow the conflict pattern. Conversely, when priority is assigned to common interests, as it was, for example, during World War

II, and when conflicting interests become secondary, relations between the USSR and the United States fall into the pattern of cooperation.

The Pattern of Cooperation

The current stage in Soviet-American relations could be described as a transition stage. Both of our states have acknowledged at the highest level that "they are now emerging from a protracted confrontation and are willing to leave it behind."¹³

What should the future pattern of USSR-U.S. relations be? In spite of the importance of detente and the need for it, it does not seem to be a goal in itself. We should recall that the CPSU Program says that "the party will strive for the development of the process of international detente, viewing it as a natural and necessary stage on the way toward the creation of a comprehensive and reliable security system."¹⁴ Consequently, detente is only a stage on the way to the goal of a comprehensive system of international security, organically uniting the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres. As we know, a security system demands the ally type of relationship and the cooperative pattern of relations between participants.

The creation of a system of international security would certainly be unthinkable without the cardinal restructuring of USSR-U.S. relations. The new edition of the party program explains this restructuring in detail: "The CPSU wants normal and stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, relations presupposing non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for one another's legal interests, the recognition and implementation of the principle of equality and equivalent security, and the establishment of maximum mutual trust on this basis. Differences in social systems and ideologies should not create tension. There are objective prerequisites for productive and mutually beneficial Soviet-American cooperation in various spheres."¹⁵

Many Americans are also growing more aware of the need for better relations with the Soviet Union. According to a poll conducted by D. Yankelovich in spring 1988, only 39 percent of the Americans would prefer to continue securing U.S. military superiority while 76 percent are willing to support "cooperation in the resolution of problems" by the two powers to put an end to the arms race.

The need for cooperation in Soviet-American relations stems from the need to create a comprehensive system of international security—i.e., a new "supra-systemic" coalition (as in the years of World War II) for the sake of survival and on the basis of the interdependence and balanced interests of all sides. A global balance of interests will presuppose the balanced interests of the

two states with the greatest military, economic, scientific, and spiritual potential in today's world, two states with a special and unique responsibility to the entire human community.

At the Moscow summit meeting M.S. Gorbachev said: "I see a future in which the USSR and the United States will build their relations not on the basis of intimidation and the improvement of military potential, but on the basis of disarmament and a balance of interests in comprehensive cooperation."¹⁶ There is no question that no improvement in the international situation can be expected without the normalization and demilitarization of Soviet-American relations and without concerted efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States to stop the arms race, destroy all nuclear weapons, and settle regional conflicts.

Of course, this does not mean the establishment of the notorious Soviet-American "condominium." Although the USSR and the United States play an important role and have a great deal of influence, numerous states and peoples are interacting in today's world. Each country has the right to make its own socioeconomic choices, to have its own ideology, and to choose revolution or the status quo.

On the basis of all this, the following general statements seem valid.

The interaction of USSR and U.S. interests does not lead automatically to antagonism. On the contrary, the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States can be balanced by expanding spheres of common and parallel interests and limiting conflicting and diverging interests. The cooperative pattern of Soviet-American relations pursues more far-reaching goals than the mere relaxation of international tension. A new system of coordinates must be established for these relations. The USSR and the United States can and must cooperate in the resolution of the global problems of civilization and must work together to find the solutions to the most urgent political problems of the present day. There are tangible prerequisites to ensure that our bilateral relations stay ahead of world developments instead of lagging behind them. The cooperative pattern of Soviet-American relations and the intelligent and realistic interaction of the two powers are simultaneously an essential condition and a constituent part of the international security system meeting the interests of all countries and peoples.

Footnotes

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 18, p 271.

2. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 4, p 220.

3. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 176.

4. Ibid., p 64.

5. M.S. Gorbachev, "Izbrannyye rechi i statyi" [Collected Speeches and Articles], vol 3, Moscow, 1987, p 100.

6. Ibid., pp 70-71.

7. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and the World], Moscow, 1987, pp 222, 146.

8. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 41, p 337.

9. K. Marx and F. Engels, Op. cit., vol 16, p 11.

10. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira," p 162.

11. "General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's Visit to the United States of America, 7-10 December 1987. Documents and Materials," Moscow, 1987, p 131.

12. G.A. Trofimenko and I.L. Sheydina write: "The United States and the Soviet Union have areas of coinciding interests, parallel interests, diverging but not conflicting interests, and, finally, converging and conflicting interests" ("Razryadka i konfrontatsiya: dve tendentsii v sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniakh" [Detente and Confrontation: Two Tendencies in Contemporary International Relations], Moscow, 1987, p 238).

13. "General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's Visit to the United States of America," p 118.

14. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz," p 177.

15. Ibid.

16. PRAVDA, 1 June 1988.

Review of New Thinking Concept

18030001b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 88 (signed to press 22 Jul 88) pp 34-40

[Article by Jeremy Azrael, RAND Corporation researcher (Santa Monica, California), and Stephen Sestanovich, head of the Soviet Studies Department of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; first paragraph is SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA introduction]

[Text] The second issue of our journal in 1987 contained an article by G.A. Trofimenko, "New Realities and the New Thinking." In this article he disagreed with the thesis of an article by two American specialists, J. Azrael and S. Sestanovich (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, final issue for 1985), who maintain that the Reagan Administration's foreign policy initiatives were aimed at revising the particular "rules of play" in international affairs that displayed a clear "pro-Soviet bias." The editors received a response to the article "New Realities and the New Thinking" from these authors, and we are printing it along with the comments of G.A. Trofimenko.

Last year you published an article by G.A. Trofimenko in your journal, in which he criticized some of the statements we made in our analysis of Reagan Administration policy toward the Soviet Union in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS.¹ In our response we will try to clarify our original arguments and also to ask some questions about the Soviet concept of the new thinking, which was the main topic of G.A. Trofimenko's article. We are grateful to SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA for this opportunity to speak, because we agree that the honest and free exchange of opinions is an important condition of civilized international relations.

In our analysis of Reagan Administration approaches to the competition between the superpowers, we took the changes in the global balance of power in what was known as the period of detente in the 1970's as our point of departure. In our opinion, the most striking element of American policy in the 1980's was the new show of determination to stop and reverse two processes previous U.S. administrations had unsuccessfully tried to curtail by means of bilateral talks and unilateral restraint. The first process is the change in the balance of military power as a result of the United States' reluctance to try to keep up with the USSR as it maintained a high level of military spending in the late 1960's and in the 1970's. The second is the constant expansion of the Soviet military presence in the Third World.

In the sphere of arms, it seems to us that there were two reasons for the United States' acute and growing concern. The first was the continued deployment of hundreds of SS-20 missiles in Europe and Asia during the course of a unilateral arms buildup which most non-Soviet observers viewed as an attempt at the political

and military intimidation of Western Europe. The second was Moscow's stubborn refusal, even after more than a decade of talks, to consider the possibility of reducing strategic nuclear forces, with the exception of militarily insignificant or secondary forces. American military experts were particularly disturbed by the modernization of Soviet land-based ballistic missiles, including the highly destabilizing "heavy missiles," which have no counterpart in the U.S. military arsenal.

As for the Soviet Union's behavior in the Third World, we said in our article that two events were the catalysts with the deciding influence on U.S. policy: the use of proxy Cuban forces, on the initiative of the USSR and with its support, to give Soviet-protected regimes in Africa crucially important military superiority in a struggle which would have remained only a local power struggle if not for this assistance; and the Soviet invasion of neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan in 1979. To Americans these actions seemed absolutely inconsistent with the hopes and expectations of detente. They created something like a social and political "backlash" and gave rise to several problems which could not have been ignored by any U.S. administration in 1980, whether it had been headed by Ronald Reagan or anyone else.

In his brief comments on our article, G.A. Trofimenko does not directly dispute the fact that the American public mood and American administration policy toward the USSR at the beginning of the 1980's could have been a response to the USSR's behavior in the 1970's, but he does categorically deny our statement that this behavior violated the "rules of play" of detente. For him, the real reason for the Reagan Administration's opposition to Soviet policy in the 1970's was not that this policy gave the Soviet Union unilateral advantages. On the contrary, he asserts that the United States was unprepared to accept anything but unilateral advantages for itself.

The most disturbing thing about this argument is that it casts suspicions on the prospect of serious improvement in relations between the superpowers on the basis of the Soviet new thinking. Although G.A. Trofimenko expresses the profound belief that this improvement in relations will take place, he also stresses that the new thinking is essentially a continuation and expansion of the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence." But since he uses the same doctrine to justify the behavior which actually made the reversibility of detente inevitable, we cannot understand why G.A. Trofimenko is so certain that the "system of common security" is in the offing.² Nevertheless, in spite of these doubts, we are still not assuming that the new thinking will not contribute anything to the relaxation of international tension.

When we read the works of Soviet spokesmen for the new thinking, including Dr. Trofimenko, we certainly find something new in them to indicate that a process of genuine reinterpretation is definitely taking place in at

least some segments of the Soviet foreign policy establishment. Furthermore, we do not believe that these changes are targeted exclusively or even primarily at the foreign consumer. One change which attracted our attention is the appreciation of the value of compromise by the advocates of the new thinking. This is something that is deeply rooted in the Western political culture but has not always been fully appreciated in the Soviet Union.³ Other concepts which have recently been reflected in discussions of international topics by influential Soviet groups—for example, the concepts of “interdependence,” “joint security,” and “reasonable military sufficiency”—also presuppose the mutual renunciation of the “no-win situation” and the “dog-eat-dog” approach that was characteristic of Soviet policy in the past and made the lasting improvement of East-West relations seem unrealistic.

Because many postulates of the new thinking were widely accepted in the West long ago, it is not surprising that the latest Soviet statements and publications sound completely constructive to the Western ear. In fact, they sound so constructive that the Western observers who express skeptical feelings about the new thinking have focused attention primarily on the “discrepancy between words and actions.”⁴ We share this legitimate concern and we will return to it later. In our opinion, however, this is only part of the problem of the validity of recent Soviet oral and written statements. We have a few theoretical stipulations with regard to the new thinking, and we believe that the discussion should begin with them.

In Soviet discussions of the “comprehensive security system” the problem is usually divided into several categories: politico-military, economic, ecological, humanitarian, etc. As far as we can see, however, the central premise of the new thinking is that nuclear weapons in themselves are the main obstacle to the achievement of a *modus vivendi* in East-West relations. All of the possible problems in international life are blamed on the existence of nuclear weapons. For example, when USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze addressed the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1987, he said that nuclear weapons were the reason why the principles of the UN Charter could not be implemented, and that nuclear weapons diminish the value of UN institutions.⁵ We feel that this is an oversimplified approach which distorts the real state of affairs just as much as the allegation that the deployment of missiles in Europe by NATO at the beginning of the 1980's dramatically increased the risk of war. At the very least, the exclusive concentration on nuclear or conventional weapons provides too narrow a basis for the genuine reinterpretation, much less the restructuring, of international relations.

A serious discussion of the “comprehensive security system” must begin with a discussion of the significance of security in general.⁶ The first questions demanding objective answers are the following: How should states

define their interests? How should they use their strength to advance these interests? There is nothing in the nature of nuclear weapons to motivate a state to impose its own internal system on an entire group of other states. Any state that does this will create an ineradicable source of tension in international relations because it will have to use force against other nations and establish the kind of international order that will deprive these other nations of any chance of asserting their independence effectively.

This means, in our opinion, that the final test of the efficacy of the new thinking will be the desire of its Soviet supporters to take a serious and honest approach to the interrelations of their country and the countries of Eastern Europe. We do not expect Soviet scientists and officials to support President Reagan's appeal of June 1987 to tear down the Berlin Wall in connection with the sweeping program for the destruction of all barriers between Eastern and Western societies, but they must realize that a fundamental problem lies behind these kinds of proposals. A critical analysis of the political dynamics of the interrelations of the Soviet Union and the East European countries is essential to an understanding of the reasons for the absence of security and the presence of tension in Europe as a whole, in the same Europe the Soviet leaders love to call the European “common home.” An analysis of the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces is exceptionally important, but it will never explain even the reasons for the division of Europe, not to mention giving us a chance to define the means of reunification.⁷

During our discussions with Soviet scholars and officials on the division of Europe, we have sometimes been told that the West must respect the Soviet Union's security interests. Strictly speaking, the same idea is present in the statement that “there must be no attempts—direct or indirect—to influence the development of ‘unrelated’ countries or interfere in it.”⁸ In our opinion, the problem cannot be solved with the simple admonition to “recognize the objective nature of the national interests of various countries.”⁹ While we recognize the need to consider the interests of the Soviet Union, we would still dare to say that not all interests are “objective”: The majority are the result of subjective choices.¹⁰ The exercise of political power over other countries usually reflects this kind of choice, even if the ideological, economic, ethnic, or other motives behind the choice have the force of “necessity.” Comprehensive security in Europe will depend on changes in the institutions making this kind of domination possible.

The hesitation of the advocates of the new thinking in the reassessment of Soviet security concepts would probably not be so great if the Soviet Union's actions were to contribute more to the fundamental restructuring of the competition between the superpowers. As M.S. Gorbachev recently wrote, “we can say as much as we want about the need to stop the arms race and eradicate militarism and about cooperation, but nothing will change unless we start taking action.”¹¹ We realize that

the move from words to actions can be a complex and lengthy process, particularly in the sphere of international relations, but after all, the new thinking has been functioning for more than a year now, and it seems quite natural to review its achievements as well as its promises.

No other change envisaged by the new thinking is being awaited more impatiently in the West than the change in the dimensions and configuration of Soviet armed forces for the purpose of their correspondence to the doctrine of "sufficiency for defense," the transition to which has been announced. Unfortunately (with the specific exception of Moscow's consent to eliminate intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles), we still have not seen any significant signs of movement in this direction. It is possible that some changes unknown to us have already taken place, but it seems strange that Moscow would want to conceal corroborating evidence of its own position. If what one Soviet spokesman for the new thinking told a Western audience recently is true—namely that the "plans for (Soviet military) exercises have already been revised and troop maneuvers will put the emphasis on defense rather than offensive operations"—if this is really true, then is it not in the interest of the Soviet Union to present corroborating evidence?¹² In precisely the same way, Soviet officials announced that defense maintenance costs would be reassessed over the next 2 or 3 years, which will allow for a realistic comparison of U.S. and USSR military expenditures.¹³ This is an interesting innovation, but how much trust will even the new figures inspire if they are still being reassessed in secret and if they have no connection with genuinely open information about the size and deployment characteristics of Soviet armed forces?

These are particularly relevant issues in light of the American government agency reports of a recent rise in the growth rate of Soviet defense allocations, of an even higher rise in Soviet expenditures on arms shipments, and of the high budgetary and organizational priority assigned to the reinforcement of the offensive capabilities of armed forces.¹⁴

These reports could be incomplete or erroneous in some respects, but they have accorded more or less with the facts in the past, and all previous errors have tended to understate figures. The objectivity of these reports has been commended by Western scholars, and we are not prepared to reject everything they say about Soviet intentions only on the basis of the oral statements by spokesmen for the new thinking that "in time we will certainly incorporate a defensive structure in our armed forces."¹⁵

The war the Soviet Union was fighting in Afghanistan was probably the main reason why we could not take the new thinking seriously. It was hard for us to believe in the USSR's pledge to respect the integrity and independence of other countries while Soviet occupation troops were employing or supporting the scorched-earth tactic in Afghanistan and conducting raids on Pakistan from Afghan territory.¹⁶ Although we (and many other Western

observers) had been told privately by Soviet colleagues long ago that the invasion of Afghanistan was a "mistake" and that it had hurt the interests of the Soviet Union, official statements say the opposite.¹⁷ Besides this, the Soviet mass media are still publishing unconvincing reports about the constantly growing ranks of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, about the success of the policy of "national conciliation," etc.

To some extent, the Soviet policy on the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was clarified by M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 8 February 1988. The most interesting part of this document was probably the announcement of the intention not to interfere in the formation of an Afghan government. If this point of view does prevail in Soviet policy and if the rapid and complete withdrawal of troops is accomplished, even in spite of the probable fall of the Afghan communist regime, we will be less skeptical about the thesis that the new thinking will become a bridge crossing the "abyss between words and actions." Even in this case, however, we will probably want to give the Mujahedin the credit for getting rid of the abyss, although this will not keep us from acknowledging the presence of positive and practical changes in Soviet international priorities.

It is clear that Western feelings about the withdrawal of Soviet troops will depend partly on how openly the issue is discussed in the Soviet Union and on the conclusions drawn from this. Will this failure be viewed as a failure of strategy or tactics? Will it be a failure of goals or means? Will those who disagree with the decision to withdraw the troops be given a chance to speak? Will Afghanistan become a "blank space" in history? In short, without the continued growth of openness in the USSR, Western scholars and officials will not be able to determine the degree to which the significance of Afghanistan has become part of the new thinking.

We would believe more in the practical efficacy of the new thinking if the Soviet mass media were to stop publishing articles perpetuating the "stereotypes of the enemy image" and all of the "absurd lies" and "irresponsible liberties with the facts" that the new thinking is supposed to eradicate.¹⁸

We know and heartily applaud the fact that Soviet citizens were recently given an unprecedented opportunity to read and hear the international reports of some American and other Western commentators. We are also mindful of the words of one spokesman for the new thinking who recently warned us that the Soviet efforts "to create an accurate image of the West" will fail from time to time because "we are not angels."¹⁹ Nevertheless, the unsubstantiated hints in the Soviet press that Mathias Rust was an agent who was collecting intelligence information when he flew into Soviet air space were certainly discouraging, especially after the KAL-007 Korean airliner was shot down in 1983.

It was a particularly unpleasant surprise to us, just as to many other Americans who have tried to take a serious

approach to the prospect of "civilized" American-Soviet relations, when the Soviet press hinted that the AIDS virus was supposedly let loose on the world by a secret American laboratory working on preparations for biological warfare.

After Secretary of State Shultz objected to these absolutely unfounded allegations during his visit to Moscow in October 1987, the accusations were denied in IZVESTIYA, and this was followed by denials by members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences: They said at a press conference that respectable Soviet scientists never believed these lies. Although we applaud all of these corrections, it still seems to us that it is important to go further and to ask how reports of this kind are fabricated and how they get to the press (especially if no one believes them). We feel that the advocates of the new thinking should start wondering how to prevent the regular appearance and spread of these lies.

In conclusion we would like to stress once again that our contemplation of the theory and practice of the new thinking has not led us to the conclusion that this is the "old thinking" in a new disguise. Judging by the lessons we learned from the "detente" of the 1970's, we cannot judge the new thinking solely on the basis of external features until we have a better idea of what it means and what it promises in the way of changes in Soviet behavior in the international arena. We are now waiting impatiently for an exchange of opinions with Soviet specialists who might help us to clear up at least some of our doubts. If this article facilitates this kind of exchange, we will feel that we have contributed to a good cause.

Footnotes

1. G.A. Trofimenko, "New Realities and the New Thinking," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1987, No 2; J. Azrael and S. Sestanovich, "Superpower Balancing Acts," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "America and the World, 1985," pp 479-498.

2. When USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze addressed the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1987, he cited different sources of the new thinking. He said: "In essence, all of the postwar decades were nothing other than the history of a struggle between outdated political opinions and the new political thinking born of the throes of war" (PRAVDA, 25 September 1987). We trust that few people in the West, and probably even fewer in the Soviet Union, could be inspired by the idea that I.V. Stalin was the first "new thinker."

3. A. Bovin, "From the Art of War to the Art of Negotiation" (IZVESTIYA, 3 June 1987); V. Lefebvre, "Algebra of Conscience: A Comparative Analysis of Soviet and Western Ethical Systems," s.l., 1982.

4. M.S. Gorbachev, "Reality and the Guarantee of a Secure World," PRAVDA, 17 September 1987.

5. PRAVDA, 25 September 1987.

6. This also applies to discussions in the West. Scholars studying the issues the new thinking has now categorized as fundamental—for example, the issue of "interdependence"—concluded long ago that a serious approach to these matters first necessitates the study of the nature of such concepts as security, interests, and force.

7. In his book "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and the World], M.S. Gorbachev writes: "Today the main bill for the exacerbation of the split of Europe should be presented to those who turned it into a field of nuclear-missile confrontation and who are calling for the revision of the boundaries between European states" (Moscow, 1987, p 202). Without fixing the blame for the "nuclear-missile confrontation" in Europe on anyone, we must say that this is certainly not a territorial problem. As President Reagan has said, "those who pretend that this is a matter of borders or territories are hoping that the real issues of democracy and independence will go away by themselves. They will not go away."

8. PRAVDA, 17 September 1987.

9. Ye.M. Primakov, "The New Foreign Policy Philosophy," PRAVDA, 10 July 1987.

10. In this case, we agree with A. Bovin, who wrote that during intergovernmental negotiations, "each partner sets a limit on concessions to the higher interests of state security and ally commitments, but this limit is largely subjective, because it is not determined by interest 'as such' but by the interpretation and exact definition of this interest" (IZVESTIYA, 3 June 1987).

11. PRAVDA, 17 September 1987.

12. DIE PRESSE (Vienna), 15 October 1987, p 2. Daniil Proektor is being quoted here.

13. See the statement by USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Petrovskiy at the UN conference on disarmament and development.

14. "Gorbachev's Modernization Program: A Report on the State of Affairs on 19 March 1987." This was a document submitted by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency to a subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress.

15. DIE PRESSE, 15 October 1987, p 2.

16. The members of the United Nations discovered significant discrepancies between the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan and its appeals for more respect for the "authority and role of the United Nations." Resolutions supported by the overwhelming majority of UN members repeatedly demanded an end to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; the last such resolution was adopted on 10 November 1987 with the support of 123 nations;

only 18 UN members (including Belorussia and the Ukraine) supported the Soviet Union (it is also significant that the majority of UN members called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese occupation troops from Cambodia, and this also failed to change the Vietnamese position).

17. For example, when Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev was interviewed by Western journalists, he said that the invasion of Afghanistan was "not a mistake" (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 September 1987).

18. PRAVDA, 17 September 1987. We said that the advocates of the new thinking sometimes contribute to the creation of sinister images of the West themselves. For example, one quite prominent journalist recently wrote that if the current arms reduction program should fail, the international balance of power will be tipped in the West's favor again and the danger of war will increase; in other words, the West is still striving for a nuclear confrontation that will destroy the Soviet Union (IZVESTIYA, 11 July 1987). All of this is quite reminiscent of the Soviet campaign of the early 1980's about the "mounting danger of war," which was intended to send the Western public into a panic. The main theme of the campaign was the idea that there was a greater risk of nuclear war, and the clear purpose of the campaign was the prevention of the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe by NATO by turning European public opinion against these missiles. When we look back at all of this now, all of us can see that there was no sudden exacerbation of the situation leading to an increased risk of nuclear war. This was a purely rhetorical threat, created to serve the purposes of political diplomacy, even at the cost of creating an atmosphere of unjustified fear in the Soviet Union itself. After this campaign failed, there was no need to maintain the atmosphere of extreme anxiety, and the "danger of war" was simply buried.

19. DIE PRESSE, 15 October 1987.

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Discussion of Article on New Thinking

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[Article by Genrikh Aleksandrovich Trofimenko, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and department head at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Response to the Article by J. Azrael and S. Sestanovich"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] I would like to start by saying that scientific debate—however intense it might be—cannot be productive when one side not only pretends to have a monopoly on the truth but also takes the position of a

judge and uses the criteria of its truth and no other to judge the actions of the other side and all other members of the world community. And this is precisely the kind of impression the article by my two American colleagues conveys—it sounds like a set of peremptory instructions and, to some extent, a judicial conviction.

One of the distinctive features of our new thinking is that we have renounced all claims to having the final word on the truth, especially since finding the truth in the social sciences is quite a different matter from employing axioms in the natural sciences. Subjective class considerations, ethnic features, and even geographic overtones play an important role in various generalizations. After all, it is no coincidence that strategic weapons systems are described—both by American and by Soviet authors—as "stabilizing" or "destabilizing" depending primarily on the direction in which they are to fly! Besides this, a priori stereotypes or even someone's "authoritative" remarks are often accepted as the truth!

A second observation, closely related to the first, concerns the frequent speculative use of the term "new thinking" for unfounded "accusations." This is now a popular feature of American arguments. How is it, they ask, that you have embraced the new thinking and have rehabilitated Bukharin but do not want to admit that Soviet policy in Africa is aggressive? Pardon me, gentlemen, but the new thinking certainly does not and cannot mean that, just because we have admitted some of our earlier mistakes or incorrect actions, within the country and abroad, everything we ever did in the past should automatically be considered a mistake now and that we should view everything through the eyes of the United States. Certainly not. For example, I cannot agree with the American authors' statement about the "changing balance of military power" that allegedly resulted from the "reluctance of the United States to try to keep up with the USSR," or with their assertion that adherence to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence is incompatible with the construction of a system of common security.

But before I begin arguing with some of the specific statements that were made by the authors of the response to my article, I want to say that I do agree with them on some matters.

I agree that the Soviet Union's deployment of hundreds of SS-20 missiles in Europe was seen by the West Europeans as "an attempt to intimidate Western Europe." Of course, when the USSR deployed these missiles, it was striving to maintain the balance, and not to intimidate Western Europe. The Soviet medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles had been part of this balance since the 1950's, but by the beginning of the 1970's they were hopelessly obsolete. The Soviet Union was trying to catch up with the United States in strategic arms and could not attend to these missiles for some time. It was not until the middle of the 1970's that the

USSR was able to begin replacing the obsolete Euromissiles with new ones. I am certain that if we had done this in a different way, announcing in advance our replacement plans and revealing that our purpose was a response to NATO's two modernizations of its nuclear arms in Europe (and most of the U.S. and NATO nuclear devices are on dual-purpose systems, primarily aircraft) and that the stabilization of the nuclear Eurobalance at lower levels could have been discussed and accomplished if NATO had been willing to do so—if we had done it in this way, the reaction in Western Europe and in the United States would have been completely different. The way that we did do it, however, certainly could have looked like an attempt to exert pressure.

I agree with Azrael and Sestanovich that U.S. administration policy in the beginning of the 1980's was a response to the USSR's behavior in the 1970's. To some extent, the arms race is a process of action and reaction for the USSR and the United States, but what, I ask you, was the Reagan Administration reacting to at the beginning of the 1980's? What was the change in the balance of military power? Was it that the USSR had supposedly raced far ahead of the United States in strategic weapons, as President Reagan maintained? This is impossible to believe: When the SALT II treaty was concluded in the middle of 1979, it recorded parity between the USSR and the United States in the sphere of strategic arms. The USSR had approximately 200 more carriers than the United States, but the United States had almost twice as many weapons (9,200 as compared to the USSR's 5,000) on them (and this is the main criterion).¹ In spite of this disparity, the Soviet Union agreed, in the interest of slowing down and stopping the arms race, to accept the SALT II treaty's correspondence to the principle of equality and equivalent security. It is quite obvious that no significant changes could have taken place in the Soviet-American strategic balance in the year and a half between the time the treaty was signed and the arrival of the Reagan Administration (and this is corroborated by American official sources).² Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration decided to start a new round of the strategic offensive arms race and to begin a new race for strategic defensive arms, although the latter were prohibited by the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty. Why? To "catch up" with the USSR, as President Reagan said, without offering any proof? Certainly not. It was started in order to destroy the U.S.-USSR parity in strategic arms, which was recorded in the SALT II treaty with the consent of the earlier administration of Democrat J. Carter but aroused vehement objections from the segment of the U.S. ruling elite that took charge of the government along with President Reagan.

The hope of breaking out of the state of parity and returning to a position of strength was what lay behind the American failure to ratify the SALT II treaty, the new round of the offensive arms race the United States started in 1981, and the beginning of the strategic defensive arms race, including a race in space, publicly announced in the President's speech of 23 March 1983

on the "Strategic Defense Initiative." Therefore, there was a response to "Soviet behavior," but it was a refusal to accept the strategic equality the Soviet Union had finally achieved through tremendous public effort.

I assume that it was easier for the Reagan Administration to "sell" its new program of intensive military construction to the American voters after the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan and began military operations there, but I honestly believe that the main foreign policy factor contributing to Reagan's victory in the 1980 election was not the behavior of the USSR as much as the humiliation America suffered when the American diplomats were taken hostage in Iran and were kept there for 444 days in spite of the American administration's numerous attempts (peaceful and military) to free them. This is what gave rise to the wave of nationalism in the United States that was so auspicious for the propaganda of conservatives, fundamentalists of various types, "born-again Christians" and, unfortunately, all kinds of anti-Soviets, with their constant refrain: "If Iran could humiliate us in this way, just think of what the Soviets could do to us if they should pull ahead of us in the race!"

But the Soviet Union had no intention of pulling ahead in the military sphere, and this was repeatedly stressed in official documents and statements by Soviet leaders. They wanted only one thing—to maintain the Soviet-American strategic balance at ever lower levels. It was precisely this parity that the United States could accept verbally—in joint Soviet-American statements—but had a hard time accepting in fact! "I said repeatedly...that the term 'deterrence' in its crudest form always included American strategic superiority," H. Kissinger said at a conference on NATO issues. "It always presupposed the indisputable ability of America to deliver a first strike. As this ability was reduced and as the reduction was accelerated by the pressure of our intellectual community, the classic term 'deterrence' lost its credibility."³ The restoration of this "credibility"—or, to put it more simply, the restoration of the credibility of intimidation from a position of strength—was the aim of the Republican administration's military program. And it was not until it realized in the middle of the 1980's that superiority in offensive arms was unattainable and superiority in defense in space was also quite problematic and, in any case, was concealed in the mists of future decades, it was only after all of this that it began serious talks with the USSR on nuclear arms limitation and reduction.

I also agree with the authors that our propaganda may have gone too far with its statements about the increased risk of nuclear war as a result of political events in the 1980's. These statements (just as the accompanying optimistic assessments of the U.S. chances of establishing world dominion) somehow did not fit into the situation of Soviet-American strategic parity, which Soviet political and military leaders regarded as a historic achievement of socialism. A closer look revealed an illogical line of reasoning: The Soviet Union acquired strategic strength equal to the strength of the main

capitalist power, the United States, and this strength could not block the aggressive aims of militarist forces because the threat that these forces would start a war was greater than it had been when the USSR and its allies were weaker. The new Soviet leadership had to correct this discrepancy by stressing that the increased danger of war was not a result of reckless behavior by Western leaders, but of the "inner workings" of the arms race.

"The larger a nuclear weapon is," M.S. Gorbachev said, "the less chance there is of its 'obedient behavior,' so to speak. The spread of these weapons, the increasing complexity of related technical systems, the increased scales of shipments, and the constant possibility of technical malfunctions or displays of human weakness or ill will—all of this combined represents the huge set of circumstances determining whether mankind is to be or not to be."⁴

An understanding of this fact is now apparent in the United States as well. In a joint statement at the summit level in Moscow in June 1988, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States solemnly reaffirmed their conviction that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that this kind of war must never be started. Both leaders underscored their determination to prevent any kind of war between the Soviet Union and the United States—nuclear or conventional—and their renunciation of any intention to strive for military superiority.

In their article, Azrael and Sestanovich ask several questions which simply cannot be answered in one or even a few articles, particularly in view of the fact that the authors themselves merely ask the questions and do not suggest any answers of their own. These are questions like the following: How will states define their interests? How will they use their strength to advance these interests? To what degree is the nature of the national interests of a state objective? Literally thousands of theoretical works have been written on these topics in the United States, the USSR, and other countries, and they certainly did not settle the debates on national interests. This is why it would be unforgivably arrogant to try to answer these questions in two or three paragraphs after they have been discussed by experts throughout most of our century.

It is important to simply underscore a few facts: The public and specialists in the United States and the USSR have displayed a greater interest in the concept of national interests in recent years. In the United States, in my opinion, this has been due largely to the indefinite or omnivorous nature of the earlier position, when anything that happened in the world was depicted as an injury to U.S. national interests. It is precisely this "omnipresence," which seemed to automatically involve the United States in any conflict in the world and eradicate the distinctions between the genuinely vital interests of the nation and the secondary or specific interests of various groups, that is now being opposed by

the members of the American intellectual elite (including some members of the ruling class) who want U.S. foreign policy to be more positive, less impulsive, more complete and consistent over the long range, less tense and, first and foremost, more capable of stabilizing the international situation and alleviating global tension.

People in the Soviet Union are also reassessing and reinterpreting the USSR's fundamental interests in the world arena, and during this process the Soviet leadership has drawn several radically new conclusions. The first is the conclusion regarding the common destiny of the different national units constituting human civilization and regarding the interdependence and integrity of the world. The second is that the interest in the survival of the human race is a general and supreme interest of the world community and will necessitate the removal of the institution of war from societal life. The third is that the interests of self-preservation demand the acknowledgement of the priority of general human values over national, class, racial, and other values. The fourth is that the advancement of these general human interests will require cooperation by all states, in spite of the continuation of their social, economic, and ideological rivalry.

Furthermore, it is obvious that both sides, in the case of the USSR and the United States, or each country, in the case of the world as a whole, do have objectively vital interests which can be recognized by all of the other members of a neighborly community. Some of these national interests might conflict, and this is understandable in view of the realities of the multifaceted and multidimensional world. These conflicts between genuine national interests can be eliminated or alleviated only as a result of goodwill and constructive dialogue by equals and the resolution of problems on the basis of a "give-and-take" relationship, or, in other words, on the basis of compromise. Compromises can lead to a balance of interests acceptable to all parties to the dialogue (or negotiations), and this balance should stabilize the regional or global situation. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Soviet-American INF Treaty are good examples of this kind of balance of interests. In their latest decisions at the Stockholm meeting, the 35 members of the world community party to the CSCE adopted several important principles pertaining to the non-use of force or threats of force in international relations, expanding and clarifying their commitments in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The observance and implementation of these principles will give the people of all the states party to the conference an opportunity to make sovereign choices of various development patterns and freely manage their own destiny, territory, and resources. These principles are amplifications of the fundamental principle of peaceful coexistence, which has now been recognized by the overwhelming majority of states in the world as the most important principle of international relations. In this context, I cannot understand why my

American colleagues have skeptical feelings about the principle of peaceful coexistence and why they are trying to contrast it with the new thinking.

What, pray tell, could be wrong with the idea of peaceful coexistence? At the beginning of this century the idea was the product of the thinking—the new thinking of that time—of V.I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet State. We know that Lenin and his associates in the party believed that the revolution in Russia should start a process of worldwide proletarian revolution and that the Russian revolution was justifiable only in that context. The main international duty of the insurgent people of Russia, many leaders of the revolution believed, was to urge the people of other European countries to follow the Russian example and fight a battle against their own bourgeoisie. Lenin was already reconsidering this approach during the October rebellion. In a report on the new government's first decree, the Decree on Peace, at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 26 October (8 November) 1917, Lenin stressed that "our appeals must be addressed to governments and people. We cannot ignore governments."⁵ Nevertheless, we must frankly admit that V.I. Lenin did not regard peaceful coexistence (or peaceful cohabitation, as he called it) as a final or permanent state, but only as an interval in the process of worldwide proletarian revolution. This revolution, in Lenin's opinion, was supposed to take the form of mass uprisings primarily in other European countries and was not to be the result of the "export of revolution" by the Soviet republic. This kind of export was completely rejected by the leader of the worker and peasant revolution in Russia. Just a few months after the revolution, Lenin wrote in a PRAVDA article that the "catalytic theory" of international revolution "would completely conflict with Marxism, which has always refuted the 'catalysis' of revolutions that have developed as the class contradictions engendering revolution have grown increasingly acute."⁶ In 1920 the Soviet Government officially announced that the principle of peaceful coexistence would be the fundamental principle of its policy over the long range. It declared: "Our motto has always been the same: peaceful coexistence with all other governments. Reality itself has made us and other states realize the need to establish lasting relations between the worker and peasant government and the capitalist governments."⁷

Even after this, however, the doctrine of peaceful coexistence did not remain static; it developed along with the world situation and the Soviet State itself. I cannot trace its evolution in detail here, but I do want to point out four important events.

1. The USSR's cooperation with Western democracies in the coalition of states fighting against German fascism and Japanese militarism. The socialist and capitalist states united for the purpose of eradicating the aggressive nationalism and militarism of several states with a capitalist economy. And they did not unite simply for the purpose of defeating these sinister forces, but also for

the purpose of building a new democratic world, and the result of this was the creation of the United Nations in order to, as its charter says, "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors"—in other words, to coexist peacefully.

2. The development of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence by the 20th CPSU Congress, which stated in its resolution on the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee that, although the economic bases for war still exist, "war is not a fatal inevitability." Although the term "fatal" sounds somewhat unfamiliar to the Marxist ear, this authoritative statement meant that the USSR did not believe that war with capitalism was inevitable or unavoidable. To a certain extent, this was a revision of the earlier statements about the inevitability of war in the contemporary era.

3. The signing of the document by the USSR and the United States in May 1972 on the fundamental principles of their interrelations, in which the sides expressed the common belief that "in the nuclear age there is no other basis for the maintenance of relations than peaceful coexistence." This document is signed by a president of the United States, and by a Republican president at that.

Finally, and M.S. Gorbachev stressed this in his book "Perestroika" when he was discussing the new edition of the CPSU program approved by the 27th CPSU Congress of February-March 1986: "We felt it was no longer possible to retain the definition of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social structures as a 'specific form of class struggle.'"⁸

All of this is graphic evidence that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence is not a stagnant dogma, but a living and developing concept which takes the realities of the era into consideration in its development. Is this doctrine responsible for the "reversibility of detente" in USSR-U.S. relations in the late 1970's and early 1980's? It seems to me that detente became reversible because the principle of peaceful coexistence was theoretically accepted by the sides but was not implemented consistently enough in the practice of foreign policy. If we are willing to admit that the entry of Afghanistan by Soviet troops did cause the deterioration of Soviet-American relations, the Americans must admit in turn that the course of action Washington chose at the end of the 1970's did not contribute to the preservation of detente and even undermined its foundations. This course of action included the increase in the U.S. military budget, which began in Carter's time; the attempts to turn the PRC (with the aid of Beijing's foreign policy line of that time) into a "NATO member" and to assign it "one war" in Asia (against the USSR) after the United States eliminated it from its own global strategy; the concentration of a colossal naval force near the USSR's southern borders and the preparations for an invasion of Iran; the incredible attempts to eliminate all USSR influence in the Middle East (despite the USSR's ties of long

standing with several Arab states); the United States' curtailment of trade relations with our country and the liquidation or suspension of several agreements on cooperation and dozens of joint projects; the references to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and the unprecedented fueling of anti-Sovietism in government propaganda, etc. Therefore, frankly speaking, the American side contributed much more than the Soviet side to the subversion of American-Soviet detente.

As for the authors' assertions about the Cuban forces acting as the USSR's "proxies" in Africa, it might not be a bad thing for them to remember that Cuba has its own score to settle with the United States and its own relationship with the MPLA (now the MPLA-Labor Party)—the main movement for the liberation of Angola. When Angola won its independence, South Africa began threatening it, and not only threatening it but also using military force to unseat the government in Luanda headed by MPLA Agostinho Neto. The Cuban Government came to the aid of the government of the People's Republic of Angola on its own initiative. In spite of all the yelling in the United States about the "Soviet military infiltration of the Third World," there were fewer Soviet military advisers and specialists in all of the Third World countries in the late 1970's and the 1980's (not counting the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan) than U.S. military specialists just in Saudi Arabia.

Europe occupies a prominent place in the article by Azrael and Sestanovich. The authors declare that the problem of confrontation in Europe is not a problem of borders or territories, but then we cannot understand why they support President Reagan's appeal to "tear down the Berlin Wall," which aids in the precise delineation of a border. The important thing, of course, is not this contradictions in terms. They reduce the entire problem of European relations to the relations between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. The crux of the problem, however, is the division of Europe and the armed confrontation between the two blocs. This confrontation is extremely serious. There are more soldiers and weapons per unit of territory here than anywhere else in the world. And no European problems can be solved without the elimination or considerable alleviation of this confrontation. No matter how much the USSR and its allies want to improve the situation in Europe, they cannot do this without the cooperation of the United States and its West European NATO allies. No matter how much the USSR wants to change the structure and disposition of its armed forces in Central Europe in the direction of "non-provocative defense," radical steps in this direction can be taken only if the West takes these steps too. As General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, said, "the limits of defense sufficiency (of the Soviet Armed Forces—G.T.) will also depend on the actions of the United States and NATO."⁹ But for 2 years now, NATO has not come up with a response to the specific proposal the Warsaw Pact states made in their Budapest appeal of 11 June 1986 on the reduction of the ground troops and tactical aviation of both military alliances in Europe by one-fourth in the next few years.

In their message of 30 March 1988 to the NATO states and all countries party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Warsaw Pact states stressed that one of their top priorities is the "quickest possible conclusion of agreements at the 23d consultations within the framework of the Vienna meeting of the CSCE states on a mandate for talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and the commencement of these talks in 1988. The exchange of data on the armed forces and conventional arms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Europe in the near future would serve this purpose. The Warsaw Pact states favor the substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional arms with a corresponding reduction in military expenditures and are prepared to use these talks for the mutual disclosure and elimination of existing asymmetries and imbalances in Europe as a whole and in separate regions."¹⁰

Actions of this kind, along with the further expansion and implementation of confidence-building measures in Europe, could make the biggest contribution to the elimination of all other barriers on the continent and to the implementation of the concept of the "common European home." It would be premature, to say the least, to start by tearing down the Berlin Wall at a time when the borders of the GDR are being patrolled by the crack troops of the NATO countries, now guided by the offensive theories envisaging the seizure of the territory of socialist countries.¹¹

I assume that the time will come when the Berlin Wall will be torn down, but today there is no need to pretend that the Berlin Wall is the only problem in the world. The U.S. administration has always objected to this wall, but it has put up a 3-meter metal fence along its border with Mexico. This fence, equipped with state-of-the-art electronic alarm systems, stretches across more than a hundred kilometers. It also impedes the "free movement of people," but it still had to be erected, and ostensibly because of governmental considerations. It is probable that before all of the border walls and fences are torn down, many of the other walls dividing people should be eliminated—the walls of suspicion, fear, mistrust, and hypocrisy which were built over decades by the policy of confrontation and "cold war" and which are sometimes more impenetrable than barriers made of brick or metal! As for the authors' suggestion to "change the institutions which make it possible for large states to dominate their allies," the socialist countries requested the NATO countries long ago to begin by simultaneously dissolving the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and by liquidating their military organizations as the first step in this process.

Soviet leaders and theorists do not blame all of the problems in international life on the existence of nuclear weapons, as Azrael and Sestanovich assert, but there is no question that the presence of these weapons of mass destruction and the possibility of their broad-scale use are what distinguish the present era from all previous ones. Mankind has never had a suicide weapon until

now. Theoretically, the human race could be destroyed by some kind of outside cosmic force. This kind of disaster, connected with a gigantic meteorite which fell to earth, is modern science's explanation for the rapid disappearance of the dinosaurs, but the possession of a weapon which could produce the same effect as the earth's collision with a comet is a new feature of human life, created by people themselves as a result of their intellectual and productive efforts. The guaranteed use of the free energy of the atom only for the good of man instead of to his detriment is a colossal intellectual and political challenge for mankind, because throughout earlier eras science flourished by improving the weapons of war, and most of the heroes idolized in the past were warriors!

The new Soviet thinking wants to respond to this intellectual challenge. "During an analysis of the fundamental changes in the world," M.S. Gorbachev stressed on 28 June this year in his report at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, "we can surmount many of the stereotypes that hampered our potential and provided some opportunities for those who wanted to misrepresent our intentions." Even the axioms of the traditional thinking are being revised, such as the assumption that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means (as we know, the Marxists once armed themselves with Clausewitz' postulate). It proposes new models of worldwide security, based on the conviction that security in the nuclear age can only be universal, or only mutual in the case of U.S.-USSR relations, and must be safeguarded through agreements rather than through individual efforts in the arms race.

Of course, it is possible for people to make statements from some kind of abstract height and to say that Moscow's actions still do not correspond completely to its words, that the Soviet people will have to prove that the new thinking is a reality by doing this, that, and the other thing (and they immediately set forth the "correct" program), and that then, they announce, we shall see.... But actions, particularly in the case of colossal changes in economics, politics, and the mass mentality, take time. The American slaves were officially freed by Lincoln's proclamation of 1862, but it took more than a hundred years for the announced emancipation of the black population of the United States to become a reality. Nevertheless, it is interesting to compare the trends and directions that are being displayed in the restructuring of politics and international relations by the new thinking in the USSR and by official thinking in the United States, which is also sometimes referred to as new thinking by American leaders and theorists.

I already wrote about one contrast in the article to which Azrael and Sestanovich are responding: Whereas the Soviet Union believes that non-violence should be the basis of human life (and this is recorded in the joint USSR-Indian declaration), American statesmen believe that force and diplomacy must go hand in hand.¹²

When Soviet leaders reviewed earlier opinions, they rejected the thesis that capitalism would die and socialism would triumph in a new world war. Official American

military doctrine, however, assumes that the United States (or capitalism) will "prevail" in a nuclear conflict. In other words, the United States appears to have armed itself with the mirror image of the thesis the Soviet theorists rejected.¹³

The Soviet Union has put the emphasis on the concept of reasonable sufficiency in its military construction and wants to implement the concept of sufficiency for defense or, as they say in the West, "non-provocative defense," especially in the structure and deployment of its armed forces and conventional arms. American theorists, however, put the emphasis on purely offensive or what might be called aggressive "defense" in the sphere of strategy, and this has made a bad impression even on the United States' European allies.

The Soviet Union reviewed its theories and announced that peaceful coexistence is not a "form of class struggle," but the United States, in the "Reagan doctrine," declares the "open and unashamed American support of the anti-communist revolution,"¹⁴ according to Charles Krauthammer, who was the first to call this theory the "Reagan doctrine." The list of these contrasts could be continued.

Azrael and Sestanovich might say that all of this is nothing but words and theories. I agree, but I think that my opponents will agree with me that it is precisely theories and ideas that dictate policy and reveal new horizons. Besides this, it is obvious that the realities of the world situation—and the Moscow meeting of the leaders of the United States and the USSR demonstrated this quite clearly—are causing even confirmed anticommunists to change their opinions. This is a promising sign.

Footnotes

1. "The SALT II Treaty. Hearings..., part 1, U.S. Senate," Washington, 1979, p 99 (official testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown).

2. See the official Pentagon publication "Soviet Military Power," Washington, 1981, pp 53-63, although we must say that the new Pentagon command could not refrain from falsification even in this first brochure analyzing Soviet military strength. Although the authors of the brochure admit that Soviet long-range bomber aviation consists of just over 150 Tu-95 and Myasishchev bombers (the number recorded in the data on strategic forces the two sides exchanged when the SALT II Treaty was signed), they slyly mention 800 attack and support aircraft in the first paragraph of the discussion of Soviet long-range aviation. Subsequent statements indicate that three-fourths of this number are short-range bombers (called "intermediate-range bombers" in the brochure).

3. H. Kissinger, "The Political Realities of the Transatlantic Relationship," in "The Future of European Defense. Proceedings of the Second International Round

Table Conference of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission, May 24 and 25, 1985," edited by F. Bletz and R. Praaning, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1986, p 97.

4. PRAVDA, 17 February 1987.

5. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 35, p 16.

6. Ibid., p 403.

7. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], vol 2, Moscow, 1958, p 639.

8. M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira" [Perestroyka and the New Thinking for Our Country and the World], Moscow, 1987, p 150.

9. PRAVDA, 8 February 1988.

10. Ibid., 31 March 1988.

11. This is precisely how the NATO concept of the strike against second-echelon enemy forces was interpreted in the notorious report on "selective deterrence" prepared by a group of prominent American military theorists at the request of the Pentagon and the National Security Council and published in January 1988. Commenting on the proposal regarding the augmentation of NATO's potential for a "counterattack deep within enemy territory," three leading West European strategists—M. Howard (England), K. Kaiser (FRG), and F. de Rose (France)—indignantly remarked (and all three of them are confirmed "Atlanticists") that this strategy "would require the kind of transformation of NATO forces that would be economically and politically unacceptable to Europe. It would destroy the public consensus, which is based on the belief that the goals of the alliance (NATO) are purely defensive" (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 4 February 1988).

12. G. Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1985, pp 705-721.

13. The term "prevail" was used for a long time in American official documents. Under the influence of public criticism, the U.S. secretary of defense began using another, more discreet phrase in his public statements in 1983—"to end the conflict on terms favorable to the United States"—although this phrase is commonly viewed as a synonym for the earlier term. It is true that President Reagan began saying in general terms that a nuclear war could not be won in his public statements in the middle of the 1980's. The same formula was included in the Soviet-American joint statement on the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985.

14. TIME, 1 April 1985, pp 54-55.

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Accomplishments, Role of EUREKA

18030001d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 88 (signed to press 22 Jul 88) pp 51-57

[Article by V.V. Natalov: "Western Europe's Response"; passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The EUREKA¹ program was the natural result of the development of economic cooperation by West European countries. The stepped-up technological development of the United States and Japan in the 1980's aroused serious worries in the West European countries about their underdevelopment in the extremely important field of the **creation and use of the new technologies on which economic development and, consequently, economic and military potential in the 21st century will depend to a considerable extent.**

Western Europe's lag in the development of civilian and military technologies was connected less with insufficient R & D allocations than with the failure to coordinate their use. Although the West European countries were spending approximately the same amount on R & D as the United States and Japan, the dissipation of resources and the duplication of efforts caused these countries to fall far behind their main rivals in the effective use of allocations. In 1983, for example, R & D expenditures represented 2.7 percent of the GDP in the United States, 2.61 percent in Japan, 2.58 percent in the FRG, 2.47 percent in Sweden, 2.27 percent in Great Britain, and 2.15 percent in France. In spite of this, the position of West European companies was fairly weak in virtually all high-technology markets and especially in electronics and information technology: Even the West European computer market was dominated by American firms, headed by IBM, while West European companies accounted for only 10 percent of world microchip sales. Between 1970 and 1984 the West European countries' share of the total exports of advanced technological products by the OECD countries fell from 33 percent to 26 percent, and their share of imports of these products rose from 25 percent to 42 percent (in 1980).

The obvious need to unite the efforts of the West European countries in R & D led to the establishment of several joint projects in applied fields—ESPRIT (information technology), RACE (communications), BRIGHT (technological production processes), and a joint military aircraft project (military technology). All of these projects, however, were narrow in scope and did not promote any broad-scale coordination of R & D comparable to the coordination of the work on the SDI program in the United States, the coordination of projects by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and other programs.

A Response Was Necessary

It was the start of the work on the SDI program in the United States that accelerated the establishment of an all-Europe R & D program. The SDI was regarded by the West Europeans "primarily as a technological challenge to Europe," said former French Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Dumas. The intention to allocate 26 billion dollars for SDI research in the next 5 years created the real possibility of U.S. "technological breakthroughs" in all of the key areas of R & D. Besides this, although this was a military program, specialists pointed to its "possible significant impact on civilian technologies."

The immediate stimulus for the establishment of the EUREKA program was the United States' invitation of all NATO countries and Japan, Australia, Israel, and South Korea to take part in the SDI on 26 March 1985. For Western Europe this proposal, in the opinion of President F. Mitterand of France, would turn it into a continent of subcontractors. Because of this, the SDI began to be regarded not only as a military and technological program but also as a political challenge to the future independent technological development of Western Europe with all of the ensuing consequences. Just 3 weeks after the U.S. invitation, President Mitterand proposed the establishment of the EUREKA program. Its exact dimensions had not been defined as yet, but it was clear that it was to be a response to the U.S. "challenge."

Although the initiative was not officially connected with the SDI program, the six fields of cooperation the French president proposed (large computers, laser technology, new materials, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, and optical electronics) coincided with the main fields of research in the SDI framework and with those the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry had chosen as priority areas up to the end of the century. In a letter to his West European colleagues, then French Foreign Minister R. Dumas first spoke of the many implications of the **EUREKA program in all civilian branches, and then in military ones as well.** When the specific areas of research were defined, some topics of definite interest to the military industry were chosen. In particular, projects in optical electronics envisaged the creation of special rectifiers and gyroscopes; in the field of new materials, materials were to be created for fuel tanks and jets; projects in microelectronics envisaged the use of components in jam-resistant communication systems, some types of space equipment, various weapons systems, radar equipment, etc.; projects in laser technology also envisaged various military applications. Therefore, this was a program for the development of civilian technologies with their possible use for military purposes, whereas the order of priorities was the opposite in the SDI—military objectives would come first.

Another indication that the EUREKA program was a response to the U.S. proposal was the fact that the initiative was set forth just before the meeting of the

foreign and defense ministers of the seven countries belonging to the Western European Union (on 22 and 23 April 1985), when a collective decision by the West European countries on the invitation to participate in the SDI was to be discussed. In accordance with the intentions of France and the FRG (the latter almost immediately supported the French initiative and began taking an active part in its implementation), the meeting was not confined to the discussion of participation in the SDI. The broader issue of the future technological development of Western Europe was also discussed. Although participants were unable to reach a common decision on the first matter, they did agree on the need to establish their own "technological community," which essentially signified approval of the proposed EUREKA program.

Formulation of Theories

In May 1985 the FRG and Great Britain favored the possible participation of West European countries in the research portion of the SDI program. At this time the Government of Great Britain, which had previously had reservations about the French initiative (just as the Government of the Netherlands), began displaying greater interest in its implementation. At the same time it announced its intention to participate in the SDI program: In its opinion, the two programs were not incompatible.

Several large West European companies producing high-technology items, including some French firms, simultaneously announced their desire to participate in SDI research and development projects: SEP, a producer of jet engines, including the engines for nuclear weapon carriers and the Aryan space rocket; Reosc, the producer of precision optical equipment, which had already been awarded a contract by the U.S. Navy for a large mirror for experiments with powerful lasers; and Matra, one of the largest producers of electronic equipment.

The idea of simultaneous work on both programs was immediately supported by the American side. At a press conference held on 23 May 1985 and televised in Europe, Director J. Abrahamson of the SDI Organization said that he certainly did "not regard the EUREKA program as an attack on the United States, and the European cooperation in the development of new technologies for the reinforcement of economic and military potential is certainly not incompatible with participation in the research portion of the SDI program."

After France's two largest West European partners, the FRG and Great Britain (Italian policy was also close to their position), insisted on simultaneous participation in the EUREKA and SDI programs, France could have been put in a position of political isolation. In view of this, and in view of the demands of its own national companies for permission to participate in SDI-related R & D projects, the French Government changed its position on the EUREKA program slightly. It announced

that the programs were not competitive, and this essentially signified consent to the participation of individual countries and national companies in both programs simultaneously.

There were also some changes in the approach to the EUREKA program itself: There was more emphasis on the civilian areas of the program, which were less likely to have goals in common with the SDI. The changes in the approach to the program stemmed from political factors as well as the changes in views on its relationship to the SDI program.

The main factor was the position taken by the socialist parties in the West European countries with considerable influence in national politics, especially in France and the FRG—the two most active supporters of the EUREKA program. Just a few days after France had proposed the program, an extended session of the Socialist International Bureau, which opposed West European participation in the SDI, favored the program of European cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. Even more categorical objections to Western Europe's participation in the SDI and an even greater desire to see the EUREKA program as a peaceful alternative to the "Star Wars" program were voiced first at a meeting (on 21 May 1985) of the leaders of the two main socialist parties in Western Europe—First Secretary L. Jospin of the French Socialist Party and Chairman W. Brandt of the Social Democratic Party of Germany—and later at a meeting of the leaders of the 12 socialist parties in Western Europe on 28 May 1985 in Paris.

A second factor was the possibility of the invitation of West European countries not belonging to the EEC to participate in the EUREKA program. The involvement of these countries, most of which adhere to a neutral policy in military matters, would hardly have been possible without at least the formal renunciation of military goals. For example, the Government of Sweden specifically limited its participation to projects in line with its neutral policy.

The changes in the approach to the EUREKA program (primarily on the part of France), as a result of which it ceased to be regarded as an alternative to West European participation in SDI-related research and began to display more distinct non-military goals, aided in the acceleration of the creation of a European technological community. By the end of June 1985 France and the FRG had already agreed on the fundamental aspects of the future program. In particular, they agreed that the program would concentrate on civilian projects during this stage, although the FRG noted that the use of its results for military purposes was completely possible.

The program has been widely supported by West European industrialists. For example, the four largest electronics companies—Siemens (FRG), Phillips (Netherlands), General Electric (Great Britain), and Thomson (France), which had a combined sales volume of almost 35 billion dollars

in the middle of the 1980's and which controlled 12 percent of the world market for household electronics—published a joint declaration. It said that "EUREKA should mobilize European research potential...for the development of equipment and systems with commercial applications in both civilian and military fields."

The fundamental agreement on the EUREKA program by the main possible participants and the growing support of the program by industrial groups led to an increasingly broad consensus on organizational matters. This was evident in the success of the Council of Europe meeting of 28-29 June 1985: Participants unanimously supported the quickest possible organization of a conference on the EUREKA program.

Metamorphoses of the Program

At the first conference on the EUREKA program on 17 July 1985 in Paris, which was attended by the foreign ministers and ministers in charge of R & D from 17 West European countries² and by representatives of the Commission of the European Communities, earlier agreements were ratified. In particular, the final communique said that "EUREKA will encompass several civilian projects in various fields of advanced technology." As for the basic development guidelines of the program, the conference did not make any specific recommendations. Its political significance consisted in the metamorphosis of the program from a French initiative supported by France's EEC partners into a common project of the West European countries. Now the program guidelines will be defined by all of the participating countries, although France and the FRG will continue to play the leading role.

At the second conference (in Hannover on 5-6 November 1985),³ the adopted declaration of principles said that "the projects of the EUREKA program will serve civilian purposes and the development of the private and public sectors of the market." In this way, the countries confined themselves to the declaration of the general civilian nature of the program without mentioning the possible use of its results in military fields. Even the first 10 projects approved at the conference, however, included some which could have military applications, particularly the joint project by the French Solems company (an affiliate of the Total group) and the West German Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm firm (the largest company in the FRG's aerospace industry) for the investigation of the uses of non-crystalline silicon. This material is used in solar batteries and special shields and could be of considerable significance in launchings of the Hermes space shuttle. A massive project for the development of laser technologies, the "Eurolaser" project, was approved, and more than 30 companies and research institutes immediately expressed an interest in this project.

At the third conference⁴ in London on 30 June 1986, speakers mentioned the need to orient the program more clearly toward market demand. This position was defended quite vigorously by Great Britain.

One of the central topics at the fourth conference of ministers in Stockholm on 17 December 1986 was the role of the EUREKA program in the development of the European advanced technology market. The declaration adopted at the conference says that this would allow the West European countries to compete successfully in world markets. After the fourth conference the emphasis shifted from the projects themselves to the practical use of research findings, and this will necessitate, as Swedish Minister of Industry T. Peterson stressed, the elimination of obstacles in the trade among the 19 countries participating in the program.

The program is now aimed at serving a dual purpose: first of all, the creation of a mechanism for international cooperation in R & D and, second, the promotion of the commercial use of research findings. The latter could be achieved through the development of common industrial standards, the acceptance of technical documents issued in other countries, and other measures connected with the liberalization of the market. Because of this change in the aims of the program, it is now being viewed as a means of creating a homogeneous and dynamically developing European economic zone.

From the middle of December 1986 to the middle of September 1987 the chairman of the program was the representative from Spain, Minister of Industry and Energy L.C. Battista. During this period attention was focused on organizational and technical matters: the better coordination of efforts within the EUREKA program and between this program and other research programs, the attraction of private funding sources, the creation of a unified databank, and the adoption of auxiliary measures (connected with market development). Most of the program projects are not even halfway completed, but as their completion draws near, the significance of the establishment of common industrial standards will increase considerably. More intense contacts are already being established with the corresponding European organs for this purpose.

One important area of concern will be the assessment of project results. At the fifth conference in Madrid on 15 September 1987, French Minister of Scientific Research J. Valade said that "one of the main problems will be the acquisition of information about results and about the progress made in various projects."

What Have the Results Been Thus Far?

Therefore, in the EUREKA program's almost 3 years of existence, definite changes have taken place in its guidelines, especially with regard to military objectives.

The program was initially proposed as a response to the U.S. proposal that the West European NATO countries participate in SDI research projects. In the broader context, however, the program should be viewed more as a reaction to the degree to which these countries are lagging behind the United States and Japan in some key

areas of technological development (especially electronics and information technology) and the possibility of an even greater lag in the future.

When the general aims of the program were being officially defined, the participating countries confined themselves to the statement that it would serve civilian purposes, but that "technological breakthroughs" would inevitably lead to acceleration in civilian and military industries because they are indissolubly connected on the technological level. As DEFENSE NATIONALE commented, it would be extremely difficult to say which of the projects in the field of advanced technology could have only civilian applications. At this time 165 projects are being conducted in various fields: computers, new technologies, communication systems and equipment, new materials, medicine, transportation, biotechnology, and environmental protection. The total cost of the projects will be around 4 billion ECU (European currency units), but almost 75 percent of this sum will be spent on projects in the first four fields. Furthermore, projects connected with computers and new technologies occupy a prominent place among these (more than two-thirds of their cost).⁵ Of the 59 new projects approved at the last, fifth conference of ministers,⁶ 40 projects, representing around 70 percent of the total cost of new projects, will be conducted in these four fields. In particular, 30 will be connected with new production technologies, robot engineering, and computers (32.8 percent of the cost), including 9 projects connected with information technology (8.8 percent), 6 connected with laser technologies (18 percent), and 2 connected with communication systems and equipment (7.8 percent).

Among these projects of the EUREKA program, the most pronounced competition with the SDI program in the technological sphere can be seen in the development of laser technologies and large and high-speed computers. The development of the former is the purpose of 11 of the 165 program projects. In addition to the initial large-scale "Eurolaser" project, which is expected to take 10 years, other projects were approved in connection with the use of laser technology in machining processes (18 million ECU), the decomposition of chemical products (9 million ECU), and the creation of special photoelements (7 million ECU), projects connected with the development of a carbon monoxide laser (0.5 million ECU for project feasibility studies), laser modules and related systems (28 million ECU), high-power and high-impact excimer lasers (14.7 million and 10 million ECU respectively), and high-power solid-state lasers (19 million ECU), and two projects for the development and improvement of the use of lasers in industry and other spheres (7.5 million and 36 million ECU). The last five projects are offshoots of the Eurolaser project. The priority assigned to this field of research is attested to by the fact that as soon as the six new projects connected with laser technologies were approved at the fifth conference, the Government of the FRG announced the allocation of 194 million West German marks (around

100 million ECU) in research and development grants in this field over the next 4 years—up to 1990. This move had been officially approved by the European Commission in October 1987.

The largest projects in computers are EPROM (the creation of polyvalent volatile memory—400 million ECU), FIABEX (the development of expert systems—64 million ECU), and the production of dense high-frequency chips with gallium arsenide (60 million ECU) and special silicon chips (30 million ECU)—in other words, these are research projects in which the results can be used widely in various civilian and military fields.

Therefore, the main goal of the EUREKA program has always been the elimination of the technological lag between the West European countries and the United States and Japan and the enhancement of the competitive potential of West European firms in high-technology markets. Although the program is geared mainly to the development of civilian technologies, it will also have a significant impact on technical and technological developments in military fields. The countries participating in the program have tried not to focus attention on this fact, however, and apparently for political reasons. In the future the program will probably be geared more to market demand for high-technology products—i.e., to the commercial use of results.

Footnotes

1. European Research Coordinating Agency.
2. The 12 EEC countries and Austria, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
3. Turkey joined the participating countries at this conference.
4. Iceland was accepted as a member.
5. Calculated by the author.
6. For a discussion of the projects approved earlier, see A.D. Fedotova, "The West European EUREKA Project," EKO, 1987, No 5.

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Process of Senate Ratification of INF Treaty
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[Article by Yu.A. Ivanov, candidate of historical sciences and sector chief at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "The Pace of the Senate and the Speed of History"]

[Text] The era of nuclear disarmament began when the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination

of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) went into effect on 1 June 1988 after the exchange of ratification documents at the Moscow summit meeting. The conclusion of the treaty last December was one of the most important events in world history in recent decades. The journey to the treaty was a long and difficult one, requiring considerable effort on the part of both states and their allies.

After the treaty was signed, it took more than 4 months before it was ratified and became law.

In the United States the main events took place in the Senate and its committees, where rabid opponents of arms limitation and reduction and of the entire process of the normalization of Soviet-American relations concentrated on sabotaging the ratification of the treaty. Although they failed, the nature of the debates, the methods to which the conservatives resorted, and the entire struggle over the treaty seem quite edifying. Now new steps must be taken along the road to a nuclear-free world, a world without wars or violence. This means that the struggle is not over, and the experience accumulated thus far requires analysis and clarification.

There are significant differences between the two countries in the constitutional role of legislative bodies in the ratification of international treaties and in the machinery for this kind of decisionmaking.

In the Soviet Union the government submits an international treaty to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for consideration. The presidium then requests the foreign affairs commissions of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities to review the treaty. The INF Treaty was analyzed scrupulously and thoroughly by these commissions; a working preparatory commission was then formed for a more detailed analysis. The opinions of experts, scholars, and representatives of ministries and departments, the parliaments of the GDR and CSSR, and the Soviet and foreign public were voiced at joint sessions of the two commissions and in the preparatory commission. The INF Treaty was ratified on 28 May 1988 by an ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in accordance with its constitutional prerogative.

According to the Constitution of the United States, the president "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." In practical terms this means that the treaty ratification process consists of two stages: During the first the Senate decides whether or not it will consent to the proposed treaty, and during the second, by and with the Senate's "advice and consent," the president ratifies the treaty in accordance with his constitutional prerogative. In other words, even by and with the "advice and consent" of the Senate, the president retains the power to decide if and when a treaty should be ratified.

The discussion of the treaty in the Senate is preceded by its consideration by one or several committees. An important feature of the ratification process in the Senate is this body's power to not only register approval or disapproval of the treaty as a whole but also to make it conditional upon various amendments, reservations, or interpretations. When the reservations are included in the resolution of approval, they are binding only on the American side, but amendments to the text of the international agreement can make it completely unacceptable to the other side. In American political terminology these are known as "killer amendments." Is there any need to speak of how dangerous the attempt to impose these kinds of amendments on Soviet-American agreements can be in the sphere of disarmament, where each word and each number are carefully calculated to preserve the balance of mutual interests?

Within the first days after the signing of the INF Treaty, it was clear that the overwhelming majority of senators had positive feelings about the document as a whole. The leader of the Democratic majority, R. Byrd (West Virginia), said: "I hope we will realize how positive this treaty is." The leader of the Republicans in the Senate, R. Dole (Kansas), stressed: "I have not heard a single senator oppose the treaty or say he will vote against it. This does not mean that no one will want to object to it during the discussion of the document."

It was precisely in the Republican faction of the Senate that there was no unanimity on this matter. Some senators on the extreme right—J. Helms (North Carolina), M. Wallop (Wyoming), S. Symms (Idaho), and others—had what Dole described as "definite feelings about some aspects of the treaty." Were these definite feelings not objections? It is indicative that even the leader of the Republicans, who had entered the race for the presidential nomination and was busy campaigning, was wary of expressing unconditional support for the treaty in the first days after its signing. It was not until 17 December that Dole finally declared his views at the insistence of his campaign managers and under pressure from the White House: "I definitely support the treaty. I told the President that I support the treaty."¹

The Republican leaders in the Senate tried to urge the conservative extremists to display loyalty to the general party line. In December a Republican coordinating group was formed, consisting of 11 senators, including conservatives. As later events indicated, however, this goal was not attained.

It was a paradoxical situation: The Republican President had to rely on the Democrats to win the consent of the Senate, and not only because they held the majority there, but also because their support for the treaty was more consistent.... Democratic leader R. Byrd expressed the hope that the treaty would be approved by the middle of April. As soon as the treaty had been signed, the majority leaders formed their own coordinating group for preparations for its discussion. The group

consisted of R. Byrd and the chairmen of the three committees slated to consider the treaty: the committees on foreign relations (C. Pell, Rhode Island), on the armed services (S. Nunn, Georgia), and on intelligence (D. Boren, Oklahoma).

There was one important factor, however, that complicated the relations between the administration and the Democratic majority in the Senate. Ever since the administration had decided to step up the work on the SDI program, it had insisted on a "broad" interpretation of the 1972 Soviet-American ABM Treaty, and the majority of Democrats in the Senate had vehement objections to this. We should recall that in March 1987 Senator Nunn shattered all of the administration's arguments in three lengthy speeches², and the matter then reached the point of a constitutional crisis. The Democrats insisted that the executive branch did not have the power to change the interpretation of the treaty in the form in which it was approved by the Senate without the Senate's consent, but the administration disagreed. The Democrats made several attempts to reinforce their position by legislative means. On 1 September 1987, long before the INF Treaty was signed, Senator Nunn sent President Reagan a letter to inform him that the administration's position on the possibility of reinterpreting treaties approved by the Senate "will have serious implications for the Senate's work in the ratification of all future treaties, including the possible treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces." In this way, the White House was warned that the discussion of an INF treaty would demand executive concessions in the constitutional disagreement over the power to interpret treaties.

In December and early January the Reagan Administration made a massive effort to neutralize the group of conservative extremists in the Senate. The President met with them several times to convince them of the need to uphold party solidarity. It appeared, however, that the President's remonstrations were having no effect on the inveterate opponents of the INF Treaty: The press constantly reported their false statements and attacks on the treaty. Conservative organizations flooded the senators with letters and petitions and launched a lobbying campaign.

The leaders of the Democratic faction attached great significance to a trip taken by an influential senator from their party, J. Biden (Delaware), in January at the request of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Biden met and spoke with the leaders of the FRG, France, and England and with influential West European politicians. He returned to the United States convinced that the United States' allies were unanimous in their opinion that the INF Treaty should be ratified as quickly as possible and without any changes. Prime Minister M. Thatcher of Great Britain told him that "if the U.S. Senate does propose a 'killer amendment' to the treaty, it will be a disaster for NATO."

The position taken by the United States' West European allies undermined the arguments of the treaty's opponents and aided considerably in its approval. Senator D. Quayle (Republican, Indiana) summed up the situation: "Even if the Senate votes against the treaty, political realities will demand the withdrawal of the missiles anyway."³

At that time the Reagan Administration was conducting thorough preparations for the upcoming debates in the Senate. A special group of 20 State Department staffers was formed to plan tactics: How could the Senate be prevented from making any changes in the treaty? The group worked in close contact with two other groups, headed by White House Chief of Staff H. Baker and National Security Adviser C. Powell. Members of the administration kept Senate staffers informed of all new developments and prepared the testimony of witnesses representing the administration and other materials and documents.

In the morning of 25 January 1988 a White House courier handed the secretary of the Senate a thick package containing the texts of the INF Treaty and the documents connected with it, as well as other documents, including a detailed analysis of the agreement by administration experts. The treaty was officially submitted to the Senate. In a letter accompanying the treaty, Ronald Reagan wrote: "I believe that this treaty is in the best interest of the United States and will be an important step in arms reduction and will strengthen the security of the United States and its allies. For this reason, I ask the Senate to offer its advice and to consent to its ratification."

According to the usual procedure in the Senate, the preliminary examination of all international treaties is one of the prerogatives of the Foreign Relations Committee. Treaties are not discussed by the full Senate until this committee has made its report. If a treaty pertains to other matters within the competence of other Senate committees, these might also be involved in its preliminary discussion. In this case, these committees hold their own hearings on the treaty and then present their reports to the Foreign Relations Committee.

This was the procedure in the Senate during the discussion of the INF Treaty. It was to be discussed first by the Committee on the Armed Services, which would concentrate on the military aspects of the treaty, and by the Select Committee on Intelligence, which was supposed to study the reliability of the verification system in the treaty in depth. In this case the procedure was not superfluous even for the supporters of the agreement—for political reasons. It was a presidential election year, and the White House wanted to include the treaty among the assets of the Republican Party, while the Democratic leaders in the Senate were making a massive effort to underscore their party's role in the discussion and approval of the treaty.

Evaluating the prospects for the discussion of the INF Treaty before the committees went to work, Senate Majority Whip A. Cranston, the experienced and influential Democratic politician from California, said: "I believe that we will almost certainly be able to reject any amendment designed to bury the treaty. I am certain that it will be approved by the Senate. The main thing we have to watch out for now is the attempt to attach amendments, reservations, or interpretations to the treaty that will make strategic arms reduction talks difficult, if not impossible."

The hearings before the two committees began on the same day that the treaty was officially submitted to the Senate. When the hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee started, Chairman C. Pell said that he regarded the treaty as "the first step in the efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race." He stressed that the treaty "has won the support of the American people." At the first meeting the committee was addressed by Secretary of State G. Shultz and heard a statement by Republican leader R. Dole, who requested the committee to recommend Senate approval of the document.

The first speakers to address the Committee on the Armed Services were Secretary of Defense F. Carlucci and Admiral W. Crowe, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both made definite statements in favor of the approval of the treaty—and both reported plans for the modernization of NATO nuclear arms.

Senator Helms launched an attack on the treaty at the first meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was the acknowledged leader of the agreement's opponents on that day and throughout the period of discussion in the Senate. He distributed a memorandum to the Republican senators on the Foreign Relations Committee. In this 180-page document, the senator argued that the treaty "would not lead to any reduction in nuclear arms," because "neither side has to destroy its nuclear warheads." He also asserted that the treaty was not verifiable and then took this opportunity to heap accusations on the USSR, ranging from its alleged constant "non-observance" of treaties to the "Soviet position on religious rights and civil liberties."

The treaty's opponents were few in number but they were extremely active. They used every opportunity to prolong the discussion of the document. In February the same Helms dreamed up a new condition: The United States should have the right to conduct inspections...in Cuba. He used the excuse that the United States "could not know of the existence of missiles and warheads of this kind there." Conservative preacher P. Robertson, another contender for the presidential nomination, picked up the ball and ran farther with it: He asserted that Soviet intermediate-range missiles were most probably deployed in Cuba. The White House and the Pentagon had to issue resolute denials.⁴

In March Helms decided to change tactics. In an effort to prove that the Soviet side was planning to "conceal" some of the missiles that were to be destroyed, he distributed a chart showing missile estimates from the State Department, the CIA, and the Defense Intelligence Agency to the members of the Foreign Relations Committee. The data conflicted and were also highly classified, and for this reason the chart was quickly retrieved. Helms insisted that he had cited previously published data. It turned out that they had been published, but the person who had supplied the newspapers with the information was...Helms' top aide, prominent conservative D. Sullivan, who had once worked for the CIA and other government agencies.⁵

Although the inveterate opponents of the treaty realized that they were not strong enough to sabotage its approval, they continued to prolong the debates with the aid of procedural loopholes, rumors, and outright slander. They were trying to prolong the approval process as much as possible in order to prevent the exchange of ratification documents at the summit meeting in Moscow and to undermine the strategic offensive arms reduction talks as much as possible.

Intensive hearings in all three Senate committees continued until the end of March. Current and former administration staffers, experts (both supporters and opponents of the treaty), and other witnesses spoke at 72 sessions. The main thing was that all of the "killer amendments" introduced by the treaty's opponents were rejected by a significant majority.

All of the hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were closed. On 22 March the committee's unanimous conclusions were submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee. The chairman of the select committee, D. Boren, conceded that the current capabilities of American intelligence would secure a "quite satisfactory" level of verification of the INF Treaty. At the same time, both Boren and the vice chairman of the committee, Republican Senator W. Cohen (Maine), insisted that if a new Soviet-American agreement should be concluded on strategic offensive arms, the capabilities of American technical intelligence would be insufficient for the verification of both agreements.⁶ The motives behind these statements became apparent later, when the American press reported that the Senate Committee on Intelligence had used the discussion of the INF Treaty as an opportunity to exert pressure on the administration in order to gain its approval of the program for the development of the latest spy satellite, the Indigo-Lacrosse, with an estimated cost of from 6 billion to 12 billion dollars.⁷

The next day, on 23 March, the Senate Committee on the Armed Services recommended the approval of the INF Treaty by a vote of 18 to 2. Only Senators G. Humphrey (Republican, New Hampshire) and the previously mentioned S. Symms voted against it. In addition, however, the committee asked the administration to clarify several

matters before the discussion of the treaty by the full Senate. In particular, the committee wanted to know whether the treaty would prohibit "futuristic" systems of intermediate- and shorter-range weapons—i.e., systems which do not exist now but might be developed in the future. The systems in question here were ones using laser, particle-beam, and microwave components.

After receiving the reports of the committees on the armed services and on intelligence, the Foreign Relations Committee began drafting a Senate "advice and consent" resolution on the ratification of the INF Treaty. The resolution was approved by the committee on 30 March by a vote of 17 to 2—Helms and L. Pressler (Republican, South Dakota).

The Democrats were able, however, to include a reservation in the draft reflecting their position on the U.S. administration's claims to the right to change the interpretation of treaties. The reservation was proposed by Senator J. Biden and was then modified slightly by A. Cranston. Referring to constitutional provisions, the amendment stipulated that "the United States will interpret this treaty in accordance with the common understanding of the treaty by the administration and the Senate at the time of the Senate's consent to its ratification," "will not consent to an interpretation differing from this common understanding, and will not recognize this kind of interpretation without the consent and recommendations of the Senate."

The fact that two Republican senators—J. Helms and F. Murkowski (Alaska)—voted for this reservation along with the Democrats can be described as one of the frequent paradoxes in the Senate. It is probable that the motive in this case was not their concern about constitutional proprieties, but the possibility of creating another obstacle to block the approval of the treaty.

The administration had vehement objections to this reservation. When White House Counsel A. Culvahouse addressed the Foreign Relations Committee, he called it an "unprecedented usurpation of the power to make treaties."⁸ The administration's supporters in the Senate also rallied against the reservation. Senator R. Lugar (Republican, Indiana) predicted a "battle" over this matter, and Senator R. Boschwitz (Republican, Minnesota) voted for the draft resolution in the committee but then threatened to change his mind.

The final report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, summarizing the results of the hearings in the committees (according to procedure, it is submitted to the Senate along with the draft resolution on "advice and consent"), was distributed on 18 April. It recommended Senate consent to the ratification of the INF Treaty "on the conditions stipulated in this report and in the resolution on ratification." This was a reference to the Biden-Cranston reservation. Because the treaty reduces nuclear arms "only slightly," the report stressed, "the significance of the INF Treaty is mainly political rather

than military." It went on to say: "The success of the treaty will depend largely on whether it will lead to the conclusion of an all-encompassing agreement on strategic offensive arms," because in the absence of this kind of agreement, it "could lose its significance if new strategic weapons lead to the augmentation of the size and force of stockpiles." In the section of the report on missiles equipped with "weapons of the future," the committee requested the administration to "work through diplomatic channels for the Soviet Union's unequivocal affirmation that future weapons will be covered by the INF Treaty."

Judging by all indications, the Senate was ready to begin the discussion of the treaty. Because of the week-long recess at the beginning of May, the debates were expected to start on 9 May. It is indicative that support for the treaty was expressed by the House of Representatives, which has no constitutional prerogative to participate in the process of the approval of treaties. When a vote was held on 19 April, 393 of its members voted for the INF Treaty, and only 7 voted against it. The symbolic vote was deliberately held before the discussion in the Senate.

During these weeks, however, the issue of "weapons of the future" in connection with the treaty was exaggerated in the Senate and in the American press to the extreme. Former Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency K. Adelman sent letters to Congress to inform it that the issue of "weapons of the future" was never discussed at Soviet-American talks; the administration did not deny this, but it did stress that there were no differences of opinion between the Soviet and American sides in this area: These weapons would be banned. Nevertheless, Senators D. Quayle, W. Cohen, B. Bradley (Democrat, New Jersey), and P. Gramm (Republican, Texas) brought the issue up several times. Chairman D. Boren of the Committee on Intelligence announced that his committee might have to hold additional hearings on this matter.

At this time, Chairman S. Nunn of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services informed journalists that the treaty might require an amendment on "weapons of the future." "We need a precise text signed by both sides," he said.⁹ It is true that Nunn changed his mind 2 days later and announced that if the administration could get a precise document on this matter from the Soviet side, no amendment would be necessary.

Time was passing inexorably, there was only a month left before the Moscow summit meeting, and the procedure of Senate approval of the treaty was clearly taking too long. Senate leaders were not doing anything to speed up the process either. Democratic Majority Leader R. Byrd remarked: "The White House will have to wait, it seems to me, until we are certain that all obstacles can be surmounted." Republican leader R. Dole, however, was vigorously promoting the quickest possible discussion of

the treaty. Another Republican, Senator R. Kasten (Wisconsin), said in one of the subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Appropriations: "It seems to me that the hearings are taking too long. Everyone knows what the crux of the problem is. I think we should conclude the discussion and make a decision by the time the President leaves for the summit meeting." Kasten clearly hinted that the party concerns of the Democratic leaders were one of the reasons for the delay.

At the end of April the senators learned that the details of the treaty verification procedure had given rise to certain differences of opinion when they were discussed by the Soviet and American sides at the preparatory talks; now these technical problems were also exaggerated beyond measure. There was even some talk about the Soviet Union's alleged "questioning" of the provisions of the treaty. The people who said this completely ignored the fact that the Soviet side had also expressed its concern about several matters at these talks....

On 9 May the administration and the leaders of both factions in the Senate agreed to postpone the discussion of the INF Treaty. Senator Byrd said: "It is clear that the problems which came up earlier have not been solved, and new ones have also come to light." Byrd and Dole expressed the hope that all differences of opinion might be resolved at the upcoming meeting between Secretary of State G. Shultz and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze on 11-12 May.

The meeting justified these hopes. Two Soviet-American documents were signed in Geneva to eliminate the difficulties and misunderstandings connected with the INF Treaty. Shultz said: "We reached completely satisfactory agreements on all of these matters."¹⁰ C. Powell returned to Washington right away and held a confidential briefing on the agreements for congressional leaders and committee chairmen.

Hearings on the results of the talks in Geneva were held in all three of the committees reviewing the treaty on 16 May, and R. Byrd announced that debates by the full Senate would begin the next day. The first meeting, which took place after lunch, was essentially procedural: The clerk started reading the text of the treaty, but even this formality had to be interrupted when there was no quorum by six o'clock.

The procedure of the discussion of treaties in the Senate consists of two stages: First the text of the document and the amendments to it is discussed, and then the text of the resolution of approval, which can also be amended, is debated. The conservative opponents of the treaty began introducing amendments to the text right away for the purpose of prolonging the discussion. Then J. Helms announced that he would not support the treaty even if he should be the only senator voting against it.

There was a veritable flood of amendments. The conservatives alleged that the treaty was not binding on the Soviet Union. They demanded that the enactment of the treaty be linked with the administration's assurances that the USSR would observe earlier agreements in this area. They proposed the postponement of the enactment of the treaty until NATO had built up its reserves of fuel and ammunition—and much more in the same vein. All of these amendments were rejected by the Senate, and by a significant majority, but they took up a great deal of time. Helms also resorted to procedural ruses: He would announce that he had amendments and would then refuse to introduce them, he would block attempts to close the debates, etc. As a result, the discussion of the treaty proceeded at what THE WASHINGTON POST described as "a snail's pace."

The second week of debates began, but the Senate still could not climb out of the morass of amendments. In an interview on the CBS television network, D. Bumpers (Democrat, Arkansas) said: "The treaty will be approved by the Senate. The only question is whether it will be approved before the summit meeting or after it. I think that the opponents of the treaty believe that if it is approved by the Senate before the meeting, it will be a success, and they do not want a successful summit meeting."

On 24 May, the day before Reagan left for Europe, R. Byrd and R. Dole had a meeting with the President, who was quite disturbed by the course of events in the Senate. After this, Byrd proposed the limitation of the debates to 30 hours. The approval of the resolution would take 60 votes, and the results of all previous votes indicated that this majority would be easy to obtain, but according to procedure, the proposal could not be put to a vote until 26 May.

The President left for Europe without waiting for the vote on the treaty, but on the same day, 25 May, the Senate leaders finally prevailed over J. Helms, and he gave up his obstructionist behavior. This was apparently a result of the threat of a vote on the limitation of the debates and the completely obvious futility of any further contention.

The Senate finally began discussing the resolution of approval. After the Foreign Relations Committee had included the abovementioned statement about the obligatory common interpretation of the treaty by the Senate and the administration in the draft resolution, some of the supporters of the SDI in the Senate began threatening to vote against the resolution in this form. During all of the time the Senate was trying to surmount the obstructionist tactics of the conservatives, a vigorous search was going on behind the scenes for a compromise on this matter. The compromise amendment R. Byrd introduced on 26 May was approved by a vote of 72 to 27. It was "intended to clarify and reinforce the Senate's role in the interpretation of this treaty," Byrd said. "The amendment was supposed to make it absolutely clear

that the common understanding reached by the executive branch and the Senate would be binding for the current President and all future presidents."

The amendment concerning "weapons of the future" and the verification of the treaty was approved unanimously (96 votes "for").

The last and deciding vote on the INF Treaty was held in the evening of 27 May. The treaty won the "advice and consent" of the Senate by an overwhelming majority—93 to 5 (four Republicans—J. Helms, G. Humphrey, S. Symms, and M. Wallop—and one Democrat—E. Hollings (South Carolina)). When the results of the vote were announced, something extraordinary happened: The senators and all of the other people present in the room applauded the historic decision. For the first time in 16 years the Senate had approved a Soviet-American agreement on disarmament.

Senate leaders immediately telephoned Ronald Reagan in Finland to inform him of the decision. The Senate resolution was delivered to Moscow by White House Chief of Staff H. Baker, who had been waiting for it in Washington. Ratification documents were exchanged during the Moscow summit meeting. On that day the INF Treaty, the first treaty on nuclear arms reduction in history, went into effect.

When the Senate was just beginning the discussion of the INF Treaty, a NEW YORK TIMES editorial said: "This test of strength will tell who will determine the future of Soviet-American relations. Will it be the advocates of the hard line, who would doom the West to endless, hopeless, costly, and potentially dangerous rivalry with Moscow? Or will it be a bipartisan coalition willing to investigate the possibilities for the use of less dangerous forms of rivalry?"¹¹ The impressive majority by which the treaty was approved in the Senate is clear testimony in favor of the latter conjecture.

It is disturbing, however, that the legislators took more than 4 months to discuss the treaty in the Senate. Furthermore, obstructionist tactics threatened to cause even more delays, and the situation was only saved by the reluctance to undermine the President's position at the summit meeting and by concern about the United States' international prestige. There is no question that the thorough discussion of agreements of this kind by the legislative bodies of both countries is absolutely necessary, but goodwill is also important: Agreements on details of a technical nature can be reached much more quickly and simply....

The cost of parliamentary democracy seems too high: A handful of opponents of a historic agreement can cause as many delays as they want in the work of the legislative body. A negative role was also played by inter-party differences of opinion, which are more pronounced in presidential election years, and by the rivalry between the White House and the Capitol, which is trying to consolidate its more active role in foreign policy.

The new foreign policy thinking is finding its way into the hearts and minds of people throughout the world. The idea of the gradual elimination of the threat of mutual nuclear annihilation, an idea set forth by our country, is winning more and more support. It is in this direction that the USSR and the United States will have to take many resolute steps, and none of them will be easy. They will be necessary, however, and speed will be of the essence.

When we examine the discussion of the INF Treaty in the Senate in this context, we might wonder whether the Senate is keeping pace with history. Traditions are a good thing, but they can sometimes conflict with progression toward a safe world.

Footnotes

1. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 December 1987.
2. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 11 March 1987, pp S2967-2986; 12 March 1987, pp S3070-3145; 13 March 1987, pp S3171-3173.
3. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 January 1988.
4. Ibid., 26 February 1988.
5. TIME, 23 May 1988, p 23.
6. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 23 March 1988.
7. THE WASHINGTON POST, 6 April 1988.
8. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 31 March 1988.
9. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 20 April 1988.
10. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 13 May 1988.
11. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 25 January 1988.

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Calendar of Soviet-U.S. Relations (April-June 1988)

18030001f Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 88 (signed to press 22 Jul 88) pp 125-127

[Text]

April

1-6—Delegates representing the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, headed by Senator B. Johnston, were in the Soviet Union on an official visit as the guests of the energy commissions of the chambers of

the USSR Supreme Soviet. The delegates visited Lenin-grad, Kiev, and Moscow. They had meetings and conversations with members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces N.F. Chervovyy, and other officials.

2—The negotiation of the draft treaty on the 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive arms and its draft protocols on inspections and on re-equipping or liquidation and the memorandum on the agreement on initial data continued in Geneva within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. In the group on space weapons the two sides began drawing up a joint draft for a future agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty.

12-14—The 11th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC) was held in Moscow. An American trade consortium and its Soviet partner, a foreign economic consortium, were established. A protocol was signed on the intention to establish joint enterprises. Agreements were reached on the establishment of joint enterprises by Occidental Petroleum and the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry and by the Honeywell company and the Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production.

The 10th session of the joint Soviet-American commission on trade affairs was held in Moscow. A protocol was signed to extend the long-term USSR-U.S. agreement on the promotion of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation to new forms of economic contacts, including the establishment of joint enterprises.

13—A draft supplementary protocol to the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was submitted by the USSR delegation at the full-scale Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of nuclear tests.

14—Representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR, and the United States signed an agreement on a political settlement for Afghanistan in Geneva. Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze spoke at a press conference.

20—Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.F. Dobrynin received Columbia University Professor M. Shulman, a renowned American expert on international relations, and his wife, Professor K. Shulman, at their request.

Consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states on the drafting of a mandate for future talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals were resumed in Vienna.

21-23—Secretary of State G. Shultz visited the USSR. He met and spoke with General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, E.A. Shevardnadze, and other officials.

25-26—In Paris USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I.A. Rogachev and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs G. Sigur had a useful and constructive exchange of views on a broad range of issues connected with the situation in the Asian-Pacific zone.

28—The American International Data Group company and the Soviet Radio i Svyaz publishing house concluded an agreement on the joint publication of a periodical, V MIRE PERSONALNYKH KOMPYUTEROV, in the USSR.

The latest session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission ended in Geneva.

30—A group of Soviet and American scientists began conducting an important joint experiment on the test site in Nevada to prove that American and Soviet scientists have reliable equipment for the verification of even the slightest underground tests. Similar experiments were already conducted successfully by specialists from both countries last year near Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan.

The spring session of the Conference on Disarmament ended in Geneva. Attention at the session was mainly focused on the drafting of a convention on the total and universal prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

May

2—The main stage of the 16th Dartmouth Conference of representatives of the Soviet and American public came to an end in Austin (Texas). The Soviet delegation was headed by one of the co-chairmen, Academician G.A. Arbatov, and the American delegation was headed by one of the founders of the Dartmouth conferences, N. Kazins, and by President D. Matthews of the Kettering Foundation.

3—Representatives of the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration signed protocols in Washington on a Soviet-American joint working group on astronomy and astrophysics and on a Soviet-American joint working group on solar-terrestrial physics.

11-12—In Geneva E.A. Shevardnadze spoke with G. Shultz and National Security Adviser C. Powell. They discussed questions connected with the ratification of the INF Treaty, including the agreement on a few technical details. An agreement between the governments of the

USSR and the United States was signed on the applicability of the INF Treaty to intermediate- and shorter-range missiles capable of carrying weapons based on existing and new physical principles ("exotic weapons").

13—Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Science and Technology B.L. Tolstykh received Chairman of the Board E. Hennessy of the Allied Signal firm (United States).

14-15—Prominent member of the U.S. business community, head of the Seagram Corporation, and President of the World Jewish Congress E. Bronfman was in Moscow and was received by E.A. Shevardnadze and A.F. Dobrynin.

16—Another meeting was held in Vienna within the framework of the consultations by representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO states on the drafting of a mandate for future talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. There was some progress in the work on several organizational and procedural matters.

17—Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev received prominent member of the American business community J. Soros, co-chairman of the Joint Soviet-American Cultural Initiative Committee.

18-19—In accordance with an earlier agreement, USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.L. Adamishin and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker met in Lisbon to discuss a broad range of issues connected with the situation in Africa.

19—Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov received President C. Hagel of the American Combustion Engineering firm and representatives of the McDermott, Ipatco, and Mitsui companies, which are all negotiating agreements on commercial cooperation with Soviet organizations.

Another round of the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe began in Vienna.

23—M.S. Gorbachev's replies to the questions of THE WASHINGTON POST and NEWSWEEK were published.

27—The U.S. Senate consented to the ratification of the Soviet-American INF Treaty by a vote of 93 to 5.

28—The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium met in the Kremlin and ratified the INF Treaty.

29 May-2 June—M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan met in Moscow. Their comprehensive and detailed discussions covered all items on the agreed agenda, including arms

limitation and reduction, human rights and humanitarian issues, the settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. A joint statement on the results of the meeting was adopted at the summit level in Moscow.

31—The following Soviet-American documents were signed: an agreement on a joint verification experiment and an agreement on information about the launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; a program of cooperation and exchanges for 1989-1991; an agreement on the creation of the combined Chayka and Loran-S radio navigation system and an agreement on maritime search and rescue operations; an agreement on cooperation in the field of transportation science and technology; an agreement on mutual relations in the fishing industry. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow exchanged notes on the expansion of the list of fields of cooperation envisaged in the intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the investigation and use of outer space for peaceful purposes of 15 April 1987 and on the renewal of the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy of 21 June 1973.

The "Fundamental Principles of a General Trade Agreement" between the Soviet foreign economic and American trade consortiums were signed in Moscow.

June

1—A ceremonial exchange of ratification documents between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on the enactment of the Soviet-American INF Treaty and the signing of a protocol on the exchange of these documents took place in the Kremlin.

M.S. Gorbachev held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists. The general secretary said that the main result of the fourth meeting was "the continuation of the dialogue which now covers all of the main aspects of world politics and bilateral relations."

2—M.S. Gorbachev met representatives of the international public from 40 countries in the Kremlin.

Another underground nuclear test was conducted on the test site in Nevada. The force of the explosion was under 150 kilotons.

6—A meeting of the Soviet-American special verification commission began in Geneva.

11—A.F. Dobrynin received President J. Brademas of New York University and Director J. Billington of the U.S. Library of Congress at their request.

14—An Alaska Airlines plane brought 87 American citizens from Nome, Alaska, to the regional center of Provideniye (Chukotka). This was a one-day goodwill visit by representatives of several Eskimo communities, businessmen, scientists, and journalists.

15—The latest round of Soviet-American consultations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons came to an end in Vienna.

A.F. Dobrynin met National Chairman of the Communist Party, USA, Gus Hall, who was passing through Moscow.

18—An international peace march initiated and organized by the Soviet Committee in Defense of Peace and an American public organization called International Peace Marches started in Washington.

21—On this day 25 specialists from the USSR arrived in Nevada to conduct a joint experiment with their American colleagues.

27—Another meeting took place in Vienna within the framework of the consultations by representatives of Warsaw Pact and NATO states on the drafting of a mandate for future talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

28—The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference began. A report on "The Progress in the Implementation of the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and Ways of Reinforcing Perestroyka" was presented by M.S. Gorbachev. The conference was covered by more than a thousand foreign newsmen, including 106 Americans.

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